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I. INTRODUCTION
For some number of years, judges and academics have debated the
pros and cons of "unpublished," or "nonprecedential,"1 judicial opin-
ions in the federal appellate courts. Academics largely, although not
unanimously, decry the practice of issuing opinions that the courts
designate, by rule, as nonbinding. 2 They argue that issuing non-
precedential opinions runs counter to the rule of law by permitting
arbitrary decisionmaking, 3 violating the Due Process and Equal Pro-
1. 1 use the term nonprecedential in this Article rather than unpublished because,
at least in the federal appellate courts, these opinions are published in the sense
of being made publicly available, either electronically or in print. See infra note
13 and accompanying text. Accordingly, although most circuit rules still use the
term unpublished opinion, that term is a misnomer, and I use it only when refer-
ring to circuit rules or other sources that use that term.
2. The seminal article on nonprecedential opinions was published thirty years ago.
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-
Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Ap-
peals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978). In 2000, however, the Eighth Circuit ruled
that the circuit's rules regarding nonprecedential opinions were unconstitutional
because they exceeded the court's Article III judicial power. Anastasoffv. United
States, 223 F.3d 898, 899-900, vacated en banc as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000). That decision brought renewed energy to the debate. Most commentators
criticize nonprecedential opinions, although the practice has some defenders. See
generally Symposium, Anastasoff, Unpublished Opinions, and "No Citation"
Rules, 3 J. App. PRc. & PROCESS 175 (2001) (collecting eleven articles on the
topic); Symposium, Have We Ceased to be a Common Law Country? A Conversa-
tion on Unpublished, Depublished, Withdrawn, and Per Curiam Opinions, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005) (collecting eleven articles on the topic). The
following sentiment is typical of academic commentary on the practice: "[W]e join
the chorus of those who contend that the practice of resolving the vast majority of
appellate cases in unpublished, nonprecedential, and uncitable opinions is a stain
on our appellate justice system." David C. Vladeck & Mitu Gulati, Judicial
Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1667, 1671 (2005).
3. See, e.g., Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Precedential
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 788-91 (2003) (questioning whether cases re-
solved through nonprecedential opinions truly receive full judicial consideration
and arguing that lack of public accountability likely results in less thorough con-
sideration); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Response, Citability and the Nature of Precedent in
the Courts of Appeals: A Response to Dean Robel, 35 IND. L. REV. 423, 428 (2002)
(arguing that prospective ability to determine the precedential value of an opin-
ion creates the appearance, if not the reality, of arbitrary decisionmaking); Pene-
lope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S.
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1504-14 (2004) (arguing that nonprecedential
opinions developed in response to increased access by outsider populations to the
[Vol. 86:895896
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tection Clauses,4 and rendering meaningless the principles of stare
decisis that presumably constrain judicial decisionmaking.
5
Judges largely, although not unanimously, defend the use of non-
precedential opinions,6 primarily on the ground that they are essen-
tial for docket management. 7 Judges say that the number of cases on
their dockets makes it impossible to draft precedential opinions in
every case while still resolving cases within a reasonable time.8 Fur-
ther, they say that limiting the number of precedential opinions is
necessary for doctrinal coherence and consistency, 9 as well as to keep
the number of precedents litigants must research to a manageable
quantity.1 0 Finally, they say that most cases are routine and do not
break new legal ground, thus making their disposition with short, un-
official opinions both efficient and appropriate. 1
federal courts and are still used to institutionalize unequal treatment of these
groups); Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-
Precedential Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 732 (2004)
(arguing that nonprecedential opinions can lead to arbitrary decisionmaking and,
even if they did not, create opportunities for and the appearance of arbitrariness).
4. See, e.g., Jessie Allen, Just Words? The Effects of No-Citation Rules in Federal
Courts of Appeals, 29 VT. L. REV. 555, 574-91 (2005); Melissa H. Weresh, The
Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. App.
PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 193-96 (2001).
5. See, e.g., Sloan, supra note 3, at 727-33; Pether, supra note 3, at 1483-1504.
6. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting Anas-
tasoffs conclusion that courts are required by the Constitution to follow prior
decisions); accord Symbol Techs. v. Lemelson Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (concluding, based on Hart's analysis, that local rules that authorize
nonprecedential opinions are valid). But see Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 900-03
(holding that the issuance of nonprecedential opinions exceeds the judiciary's Ar-
ticle III judicial power).
7. See, e.g., Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary
H.R., 107th Cong. 8 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of then-Judge Sa-
muel A. Alito, Jr., Third Circuit) (explaining that the appellate courts would be
unable to stay current with their dockets if precedential opinions were required
in every case).
8. See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (statement of Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit) (conclud-
ing that, based on current docket levels, Ninth Circuit judges do not have enough
time to write precedential opinions in all cases).
9. See, e.g., 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 5, available at http://www.call.uscourts.gov/
documents/pdfs/BlueDEC07.pdf ("The unlimited proliferation of published opin-
ions is undesirable because it tends to impair the development of the cohesive
body of law."); Hearing, supra note 7, at 12 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (argu-
ing that restricting citation to nonprecedential opinions is necessary for a circuit
to maintain a coherent, predictable, and consistent body of law).
10. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito) (noting that use of
nonprecedential opinions limits the amount of case law that attorneys must re-
search and the number of reporter volumes they must purchase).
11. See supra notes 7-9. Local circuit rules reflect these same sentiments. See, e.g.,
2D CIR. R. 32.1(a), available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/Rules/FRAP_-
LR.pdf (authorizing summary orders because "[tihe demands of contemporary
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:895
This is not an abstract legal debate. Nonprecedential opinions
have become the dominant mode of disposition for cases resolved on
the merits in the federal appellate courts. The numbers vary some-
what by circuit, but overall 84% of opinions issued by the federal
courts of appeals are nonprecedential. 12 Although frequently referred
to as unpublished opinions, nonprecedential opinions are, in fact, pub-
lished in any meaningful sense of the word.13 Accordingly, they exist
case loads require the court to be conscious of the need to utilize judicial time
effectively"); 2D CIR. R. 32.1 cmt. ("Summary orders are issued in cases in which a
precedential opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose because the result is
dictated by pre-existing precedent."); 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1, available at http:/lwww.
ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/frap2007.pdf ("The publication of opinions that
merely decide particular cases on the basis of well-settled principles of law im-
poses needless expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."); 11TH
CiR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 5 (explaining that the court's solution to the problems created
by the proliferation of precedential opinions is "to exercise imaginative and inno-
vative resourcefulness in fashioning new methods to increase judicial efficiency
and reduce the volume of published opinions"); FED. CIR. IOP 10(1), available at
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/IOPsl22006.pdf ("The current workload of the
appellate courts precludes preparation of precedential opinions in all cases. Un-
necessary precedential dispositions, with concomitant full opinions, only impede
the rendering of decisions and the preparation of precedential opinions in cases
which merit that effort.").
12. During the twelve months ending September 30, 2006, 84.1% of cases terminated
on the merits in twelve of the federal circuits were disposed of by unpublished
opinion. STATISTICS DIv., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 52
(2007) [hereinafter TABLE S-31, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2006/
completejudicialbusiness.pdf. For these twelve circuits, the percentage ranged
from a low of 59.9% in the District of Columbia Circuit to a high of 93.7% in the
Fourth Circuit. Id. The Federal Circuit does not report the number of non-
precedential opinions it issues to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
Id. One study, however, concluded that the Federal Circuit resolved 77% of its
cases from October 1, 1982, through October 23, 2003, with nonprecedential opin-
ions, with annual figures ranging from a low of 62% in 1983 to a high of 84% in
1996. Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Comment, Please Ignore This Case: An Empirical Study
of Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013,
1028 (2004).
13. Although in the not too distant past, some federal appellate opinions were truly
unpublished, today all are published, either in print in West's Federal Appendix
("Federal Appendix") reporter, or electronically on Westlaw, LexisNexis, or on the
courts' own websites. The Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits did not originally
make their nonprecedential opinions available on Westlaw or LexisNexis or in
the Federal Appendix. 1 F. App'x vii-xxiii (2001) (listing no cases from the Third,
Fifth, or Eleventh Circuits in the table of cases reported by circuit); JUDITH A.
McKENNA ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 21 (2000) (noting the three circuits that did not
initially make nonprecedential opinions available electronically). However, all
federal circuits now make their nonprecedential opinions available. See 57 F.
App'x xxiii, xxvi, xxx (2003) (listing cases from the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh
Circuits in the table of cases reported by circuit); Thomson West, Product Infor-
mation-Federal Appendix, http://west.thomson.com/store/product.aspx?r=12379
&product_id=40015694 (last visited Dec. 29, 2007) (describing the coverage of the
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as statements of law whose status is indeterminate. Do these opin-
ions bind the conduct of actors in society? Can or should lawyers use
them to advise clients?14 When, if ever, should courts feel constrained
by nonprecedential opinions? The bottom line is that the federal ap-
pellate courts have created a new substratum of precedent that does
not fit neatly within the recognized hierarchy of federal decisional law
but into which the majority of federal appellate opinions fall.15 As one
commentator recently stated: "Anyone who states that lawyers and
judges have a common understanding of how to handle unpublished
decisions is either misinformed or less than candid."16
Although the utility, necessity, and advisability of nonprecedential
opinions remain interesting issues to debate, at this point they are
somewhat beside the point. Academics have lost the debate on non-
precedential opinions. Judges feel like nonprecedential opinions are
necessary for the very survival of the federal appellate judiciary.1
7
Judges control whether nonprecedential opinions are permissible, ei-
Federal Appendix as containing opinions from all the federal circuits that are not
selected for publication in West's Federal Reporter). A requirement that all cir-
cuits make all of their opinions available on their websites appears in the E-Gov-
ernment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913-14
(codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (Supp. IV 2004)) (requiring that
the federal courts establish and maintain websites that provide "[aiccess to the
substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such
opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable
format").
14. To give just one practical example, some courts have said that legal principles
stated in nonprecedential opinions are not clearly established for purposes of a
government official's claim of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Bell v. Johnson, 308
F.3d 594, 611 (6th Cir. 2002); Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F.3d 706, 708-09
(9th Cir. 2001). How should an attorney advising government officials regarding
their constitutional duties approach these decisions? For several practical exam-
ples of the uncertainty Third Circuit nonprecedential opinions have created, see
generally Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal
Appellate Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created
Danger Doctrine in One Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217 (2006) [hereinafter Ricks,
A Case Study].
15. See infra notes 66-74, 150-57 and accompanying text.
16. Patrick J. Schiltz, Response, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 73 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Cita-
tion of Unpublished Opinions] (quoting a comment submitted regarding then pro-
posed FRAP 32.1, Letter from Bennett Evan Cooper, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, to
Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 3 (Feb. 13,
2004) [hereinafter Cooper Letter], available at http:/Iwww.secretjustice.org/pdf
fileslComments/03-AP-432.pdf).
17. This is not an exaggeration. One member of the Advisory Committee on the Fed-
eral Rules of Appellate Procedure (Appellate Rules Committee) characterized
nonprecedential opinions as "essential for the survival of the federal appellate
courts." ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE SPRING 2002
MEETING OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 25 (Apr. 22, 2002) [here-
inafter APRIL MEETING], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0402.pdf
(listing points raised by unnamed committee members).
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ther by adjudicating challenges brought through litigation or through
changes to existing procedural rules.18 And judges are not going to
give up nonprecedential opinions.
So, as the saying goes, if you can't beat 'em, join 'em. Although
some people would clearly prefer to eliminate this category of author-
ity altogether, that is simply not going to happen. The better course of
action now is to find a principled way to integrate nonprecedential
opinions into the judicial system, both to provide clarity regarding the
weight of the opinions and to preserve the legitimacy of the federal
courts.
The federal courts, with congressional approval, have begun to ad-
dress this issue with the adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure (FRAP) 32.1, a new procedural rule permitting citation of all
nonprecedential opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007.19 FRAP
32.1 now supplants the patchwork of citation norms and practices pre-
viously put in place through local circuit rules.
20
Although FRAP 32.1 is a step in the right direction, it still leaves
some important questions unanswered. By its language, the rule ad-
dresses only citation practices. 2 1 It can be read, however, to authorize
nonprecedential opinions implicitly. Because it does not expressly au-
thorize nonprecedential opinions, FRAP 32.1 fails to address a num-
ber of procedural questions regarding their issuance.2 2 More
importantly, the rule does not address the authoritative weight of
nonprecedential opinions. 23 FRAP 32.1's silence on these matters
adds to the uncertainty about the role of nonprecedential opinions in
the federal judicial system and leaves to local circuit rules matters
that would better be addressed nationally.2 4
This Article addresses the problems (and opportunities) that FRAP
32.1 creates in three parts. Part II discusses the history of FRAP 32.1,
explaining how FRAP 32.1 came to be in its present iteration. 2 5 Part
III analyzes the language of FRAP 32.1 and the interplay between the
new rule and local circuit rules regarding nonprecedential opinions.
FRAP 32.1 effectively formalizes a new substratum of appellate juris-
18. Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 OHIo ST.
L.J. 645, 690-91 (2006) (identifying the difficulty of having judges in charge of
evaluating the validity of rules of precedent of their own making). Although Con-
gress could also alter rules regarding nonprecedential opinions, the chances of
legislative action are extremely low.
19. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1.
20. See Sloan, supra note 3, at 716 n.25 (listing local circuit rules regarding citation
of nonprecedential opinions as of 2004).
21. See FED. R. App. P. 32.1.
22. Local circuit rules, however, often do address these procedural matters. See infra
section III.B and app. A.
23. See infra section III.C.
24. See infra section III.C.
25. See infra Part II.
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prudence but leaves, by default, important questions, including the
authoritative value of these opinions, to confusing and inconsistent lo-
cal circuit rules.26 Part IV proposes the next step in addressing non-
precedential opinions: expressly authorizing nonprecedential
opinions, establishing uniform procedures for their issuance, and
clearly establishing their authoritative value.2 7 Further, Part IV ar-
gues that the law of the circuit rule should be amended to define non-
precedential opinions as binding unless overruled by a later
"published" panel decision. The courts could implement this proposal
acting in their adjudicative capacity. Alternatively, FRAP 32.1 could
be revised to authorize nonprecedential opinions expressly and define
their authoritative value. However implemented, this proposal would
allow the federal appellate courts to continue to issue nonprecedential
opinions while preserving the system of precedent that they purport to
follow. The Article concludes that FRAP 32.1 is an improvement over
the prior situation and is perhaps the best that could be hoped for as a
first step in figuring out how nonprecedential opinions fit within the
federal judicial system. If the federal judiciary is unwilling to forego
nonprecedential opinions, it should take further steps to institutional-
ize them in a way that preserves judicial legitimacy and the system of
precedent. 28
II. THE HISTORY OF FRAP 32.1
FRAP 32.1 provides as follows:
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions
that have been:
(i) designated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential,"
"not precedent," or the like; and
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.
(b) Copies Required. If a party cites a federal judicial opinion, order, judg-
ment, or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly acces-
sible electronic database, the party must file and serve a copy of that
opinion, order, judgment, or disposition with the brief or other paper in
which it is cited.
2 9
This rule went into effect on December 1, 2006,30 in accordance with
the rulemaking procedures established by the Rules Enabling Act.
3 1
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. FED. R. App. P. 32.1.
30. Id. (note in 28 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 2007)).
31. The Rules Enabling Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2000) ("The Supreme
Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including pro-
ceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals."). The rulemak-
ing process has many steps. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-77 (2000). Generally, one of
2008]
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The road to adoption for this rule has been long and arduous. The
protracted history of the development of nonprecedential opinions in
the federal appellate courts over the past thirty-five years has been
detailed elsewhere, 32 and that history does not need to be repeated
here. The history of this particular rule, however, is of some inter-
est.33 FRAP 32.1 originated from a proposal submitted by the Depart-
ment of Justice to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure (Appellate Rules Committee). 34 The Appellate
Rules Committee revised the Justice Department's proposal, consider-
five Advisory Committees appointed by the Judicial Conference considers new or
amended rules. James C. Duff, The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the
Bench and Bar (Oct. 2007), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm. If
an Advisory Committee is inclined to approve a new or amended rule, it must
first obtain permission from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Standing Committee) to publish the proposed rule for public comment and hold
public hearings on the proposal. Id. If the Standing Committee approves a rule
promulgated by the Advisory Committee after publication and comments, the
rule then goes before the Judicial Conference. Id. If the Judicial Conference ap-
proves the rule, the rule is then submitted to the Supreme Court. Id. If the Su-
preme Court approves the rule, it transmits the rule to Congress. Id. Congress
then has seven months to review the rule. Id. If Congress does not act, the new
or amended rule goes into effect. Id. If Congress does not approve the rule, it
must act legislatively to reject, modify, or defer the rule. Id.
32. See generally Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the
United States Courts of Appeals, 3 J. APP. PEAC. & PROCESS 199, 207-08 (2001);
Pether, supra note 3, at 1442-65; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 2, at 1168-72;
Sloan, supra note 3, at 717-19.
33. For a more detailed history of the rule, see Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado About
Little: Explaining the Sturm Und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opin-
ions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429 (2005) [hereinafter Schiltz, Much Ado About
Little]. Schiltz was the Reporter for the Appellate Rules Committee during the
consideration of FRAP 32.1. See id. at 1429-32.
34. Id. at 1441-42. In fact, nonprecedential opinions and no-citation rules were on
the Judicial Conference's agenda as early as 1990:
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee recommended that the Ju-
dicial Conference establish an ad hoc committee to study whether tech-
nological advances gave reason to reexamine the policy on "unpublished"
opinions. The committee did not endorse a universal publication policy,
but it noted that "non-publication policies and non-citation rules present
many problems." The [Judicial] Conference did not act on that
recommendation.
During the past decade, amendments to the rules have been periodi-
cally proposed to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure to establish uniform procedures governing "unpublished"
opinions.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 7 (statement of Judge Alito). Aside from FRAP 32.1,
none of the proposals sent to the Appellate Rules Committee survived the
rulemaking process. See ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES, MINUTES OF THE
FALL 2002 MEETING 37-38 & n.1 (Nov. 18, 2002) [hereinafter NOVEMBER MEET-
ING], http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/appll02.pdf (noting that a proposal
to require the federal appellate courts to make their unpublished opinions availa-
ble electronically was removed from the Committee's study agenda in April
1998). Therefore, the Justice Department's 2001 proposal was the first serious
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ing three alternative versions of a proposed rule, all of which took
stronger positions on the validity and weight of nonprecedential opin-
ions than does the final version.
Alternative A for proposed Rule 32.1 provided that "[a] court of ap-
peals may designate an opinion as non-precedential."3 5 Alternative A
also addressed the authoritative value of nonprecedential opinions,
providing that "lain opinion designated as non-precedential may be
cited for its persuasive value, as well as to support a claim of claim
preclusion, issue preclusion, law of the case, double jeopardy, sanc-
tionable conduct, abuse of the writ, notice, or entitlement to attorney's
fees, or a similar claim."36
Alternatives B and C did not expressly authorize nonprecedential
opinions, but they both addressed the authoritative value of such deci-
sions. 3 7 Alternative B simply reiterated the citation language from
Alternative A but omitted the language expressly authorizing non-
precedential opinions. 38 Alternative C also omitted express authori-
zation of nonprecedential opinions and permitted citation in the same
or a related case for purposes of establishing claims such as law of the
case or claim preclusion.39 In subdivision (b), entitled "Persuasive
Value," this version further provided that "lain opinion designated as
non-precedential may be cited for its persuasive value regarding a ma-
terial issue, but only if no precedential opinion of the forum court ade-
quately addresses that issue. Citing non-precedential opinions for
their persuasive value is disfavored."
40
Alternatives A and C were rejected by the Appellate Rules Com-
mittee.4 1 The Committee rejected Alternative A almost immediately,
saying it did not want to pronounce by rule that nonprecedential opin-
ions are, in fact, constitutional.42 Thus, it does not seem that this
language was ever intended to be included in the rule, nor was it con-
sidered seriously by the Appellate Rules Committee. Alternative C
effort to address nonprecedential opinions through the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
35. NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 34, at 23.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 28, 31-32.
38. Id. at 28. Alternative B provides in full as follows:
An opinion designated as non-precedential may be cited for its per-
suasive value, as well as to support a claim of claim preclusion, issue
preclusion, law of the case, double jeopardy, sanctionable conduct, abuse
of the writ, notice, or entitlement to attorney's fees, or a similar claim. A
court must not impose upon the citation of non-precedential opinions any
restriction that is not generally imposed upon the citation of other
sources.
Id.
39. Id. at 31-32.
40. Id. at 32.
41. Id. at 35.
42. Id.
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was rejected as well for reasons that are not clearly articulated in the
minutes summarizing the deliberations of the Appellate Rule Commit-
tee's meeting. Apparently, the majority of the committee thought Al-
ternative C was too restrictive because it affirmatively discouraged
citation of nonprecedential opinions.43
The Committee ultimately went with a version of Alternative B,
the Goldilocks version,44 but it amended the rule to omit the reference
to the persuasive value of nonprecedential opinions. 4 5 The version
sent out for public comment provided as follows:
No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon the citation ofjudicial opin-
ions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been desig-
nated as "unpublished," "not for publication," "non-precedential," "not
precedent," or the like, unless that prohibition or restriction is generally im-
posed upon the citation of all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other
written dispositions.
4 6
As the Committee explained in the note accompanying the proposal,
the proposed rule was "extremely limited":
[Rule 32.1] takes no position on whether refusing to treat an "unpublished"
opinion as binding precedent is constitutional. It does not require any court to
issue an "unpublished" opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It does not
dictate the circumstances under which a court may choose to designate an
opinion as "unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must follow in
making that decision. It says nothing about what effect a court must give to
one of its "unpublished" opinions or to the "unpublished" opinions of another
court. The one and only issue addressed by Rule 32.1 is the citation ofjudicial
dispositions .... 47
43. Id.
44. Id. It avoided doing more than the Committee wanted to do, but also avoided
being excessively restrictive, making it just right.
45. Compare id. at 28 (listing the original Alternative B proposal) with SAMUEL A.
ALITO, JR., REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON APPELLATE RULES 28-29
(May 22, 2003) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT], http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/app08O3.pdf (listing an amended proposal for FRAP 32.1 that omitted
the first sentence from the original Alternative B proposal and retained a modi-
fied version of the original second sentence).
46. ADVISORY COMMPI'EE REPORT, supra note 45, at 28-29; see also Tony Mauro,
Courts Move Forward on Citation Change, LEGAL TIMES (Wash., D.C.), May 26,
2003, at 8 (discussing a proposed version of FRAP 32.1).
47. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 45, at 30-31 (citations omitted). This
same language, in slightly revised form, appears in the note following the rule as
adopted:
Rule 32.1 is extremely limited. It does not require any court to issue an
unpublished opinion or forbid any court from doing so. It does not dic-
tate the circumstances under which a court may choose to designate an
opinion as "unpublished" or specify the procedure that a court must fol-
low in making that determination. It says nothing about what effect a
court must give to one of its unpublished opinions or to the unpublished
opinions of another court. Rule 32.1 addresses only the citation of fed-
eral judicial dispositions that have been designated as "unpublished" or
"non-precedential"-whether or not those dispositions have been pub-
lished in some way or are precedential in some sense.
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
The Committee received an unprecedented (pun intended) number
of comments on the proposal, both positive and negative;48 the major-
ity of the negative comments were generated from the Ninth Circuit in
a campaign to derail the proposal that may have been organized by
Judge Alex Kozinski.49 After considering the comments, the Appel-
late Rules Committee sent the rule to the Judicial Conference's Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee),
recommending adoption.50 The Standing Committee, although appar-
ently favorably inclined toward the rule, remanded the rule to the Ap-
pellate Rules Committee for further study.5 1 The Appellate Rules
Committee studied the rule's probable effects 52 and ultimately revised
the proposed rule again to delete the language saying that courts
could only impose restrictions on citation of nonprecedential opinions
that they also impose on citations to other forms of authority. 53 The
proposed rule in its revised form simply prohibited restrictions on cita-
tion. 54 The Appellate Rules Committee then forwarded the revised
proposal to the Standing Committee, and the Standing Committee ac-
cepted it.55 The Standing Committee forwarded the proposed rule to
the Judicial Conference, which added a provision limiting application
of the rule to opinions issued on or after January 1, 2007, and then
forwarded it to the Supreme Court.5 6 The Supreme Court forwarded
the proposed rule to Congress. 5 7 When Congress did not act within
the statutory period, the rule as submitted became effective. 58
III. FRAP 32.1 AND LOCAL CIRCUIT RULES GOVERNING
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
In adopting FRAP 32.1, the federal courts have, for the first time,
acknowledged the existence of nonprecedential opinions in the na-
48. Stephen R. Barnett, The Dog That Did Not Bark: No-Citation Rules, Judicial
Conference Rulemaking, and Federal Public Defenders, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV.
1491, 1498 (2005); Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra note 16, at
23.
49. Barnett, supra note 48, at 1499-1500; Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note
33, at 1450-51 & n.l15.
50. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33, at 1451-53.
51. Id. at 1453-54.
52. Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra note 16, at 58-64 (describing
research conducted by the Federal Judicial Center that evaluated the effects of
permitting citation to nonprecedential opinions).
53. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33, at 1431 n.8 (noting that the Com-
mittee tinkered with the language of the rule).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1457-58.
56. Id. at 1458.
57. Tony Mauro, Court Endorses Use of Unpublished Opinions, LEGAL TIMES (Wash.,
D.C.), Apr. 17, 2006, at 15.
58. FED. R. App. P. 32.1 (effective date Dec. 1, 2006).
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tional rules.59 This national recognition of nonprecedential opinions
is an improvement over the prior situation. The federal courts endan-
gered their own legitimacy when they tried to make their own prior
opinions nonexistent. 60 And allowing citation to nonprecedential
opinions was not a huge leap because, by the time FRAP 32.1 went
into effect, the majority of the circuits already permitted citation of
nonprecedential opinions as persuasive or nonbinding authority.6 1
But the rule failed to establish clear procedures for the issuance of
nonprecedential opinions, and more importantly, failed to define the
authoritative value of nonprecedential opinions. Through these omis-
sions, FRAP 32.1 missed an opportunity to clarify the role of non-
precedential opinions in the hierarchy of federal decisional law and
left important questions regarding their issuance to a confusing and
inconsistent m6lange of local circuit rules and internal operating
procedures.
A. FRAP 32.1 Implicitly Endorses Nonprecedential
Opinions.
Opponents of FRAP 32.1 consider the rule to be the first step to-
ward prohibiting nonprecedential opinions, 6 2 even though the Advi-
59. The only other reference to nonprecedential opinions in the national rules is in
FRAP 35, which concerns grounds for rehearing en banc. FED. R. APP. P. 35. The
rule states that rehearing en banc is appropriate when a panel's decision conflicts
with an "authoritative" decision from another circuit. Id. The terminology
change in the rule is an oblique acknowledgement of nonprecedential opinions;
the only overt reference is the Advisory Committee's note, not in the rule itself.
Id. advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee's note indicates that the
rule was amended in 1998 to refer to "authoritative" decisions rather than "pub-
lished" decisions because of the differences among the circuits regarding the
treatment of "unpublished," or nonprecedential, opinions. Id.
60. Pether, supra note 3, at 1483-1528 (analyzing in significant depth the effects of
nonprecedential opinions on litigants and the judicial system to demonstrate how
they delegitimize the judiciary); Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33, at
1470 (noting that opponents of nonprecedential opinions view such opinions as
undermining judicial legitimacy).
61. Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to West's Federal Appendix: The
Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 1, 4-5 (2002)
[hereinafter Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart] (detailing local circuit citation
rules as they existed in 2001).
62. APRIL MEETING, supra note 17, at 25 ("Those speaking against a national rule
pointed out the following: ... Many circuit judges will view this as the first step
on a path that will eventually lead to the abolition of non-precedential opinions,
which are unpopular among practitioners but essential for the survival of the
federal appellate courts."); see also Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33,
at 1483 (explaining that one reason many judges opposed FRAP 32.1 was because
they expected or feared that it was the first step toward eliminating non-
precedential opinions). I first explored the implications of the rule's language in
conjunction with the slightly different version sent out for public comment.
Sloan, supra note 3, at 722-27.
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sory Committee's note has expressly stated that that is not the rule's
intent.6 3 The rule's opponents argued that allowing citation will effec-
tively convert nonprecedential opinions into precedential opinions for
two reasons. First, judges will have to put as much work into non-
precedential opinions as precedential ones if the nonprecedential ones
can be cited by parties in later cases.6 4 Second, once parties cite non-
precedential opinions, judges will feel constrained to consider and ad-
dress the nonprecedential opinions just as they would precedential
opinions.6 5 If these arguments turn out to be correct and the distinc-
tions between precedential and nonprecedential opinions become illu-
sory, judges may choose to publish more opinions and to rely less
frequently on nonprecedential opinions. Conversely, they may choose
to issue more one-word dispositions.
Far from signaling the demise of nonprecedential opinions, how-
ever, the rule's implicit validation of nonprecedential opinions legiti-
mizes them and formalizes their status as a subordinate class of
appellate authority.6 6 Although the rule does not endorse issuance of
63. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note.
64. Sloan, supra note 3, at 724.
65. Hearing, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski) ("If unpublished dis-
positions could be cited as precedent, conscientious judges would have to pay
much closer attention to their precise wording. Language that might be adequate
when applied to a particular case might well be unacceptable if applied to future
cases raising different fact patterns."). The effect would be for judges to treat all
of the opinions they write as precedential. See id.; see also Barnett, From Anas-
tasoff to Hart, supra note 61, at 12 (expressing the opinion that allowing citation
of nonprecedential opinions will cause them to be followed more often than if they
cannot be cited).
66. See K.K. DuVivier, Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the
Role of Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 397 (2001) (recognizing
that the federal appellate courts now have two tiers of precedent); Ricks, A Case
Study, supra note 14, at 222 (arguing that nonprecedential opinions have uncer-
tain legal significance and that their indeterminate status confuses courts and
litigants); Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33, at 1469 (noting two clas-
ses of federal appellate opinions: "first class" precedential opinions and "second
class" nonprecedential opinions); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Account-
ability to the Past, Present, and Future: Precedent, Politics and Power, 28 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19 (2005) (discussing the impact of "tiered appellate deci-
sionmaking" on judicial accountability); Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Un-
published Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1303 (2004) (noting that
constraints of time and resources may force the judiciary to maintain two deci-
sional tracks).
Interestingly, this layer of precedent is similar to one that would have been
created by a 1998 proposal by the Commission on Structural Alternatives for the
Federal Courts of Appeals. COMM'N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED.
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 59-66 (1998). This Commission studied the
courts' structure and caseloads and made a variety of recommendations for re-
structuring the courts to improve their performance. Id. One of the recommen-
dations was for Congress to authorize the circuit courts to create District Court
Appellate Panels (DCAPs). Id. at 64-66. These panels would consist of two dis-
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nonprecedential opinions, merely permitting citation to them creates
the inference that those opinions can validly be issued. If non-
precedential opinions are impermissible, why would the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure contain a rule affirmatively permitting citation
to them? If courts cannot validly issue nonprecedential opinions, the
appropriate rule would prohibit their issuance, not permit citation to
them. It would be strange indeed for a rule to regulate an impermissi-
ble practice.
6 7
The Advisory Committee attempted to avoid this very issue in the
note accompanying the rule by stating that the rule neither requires
nor forbids the issuance of nonprecedential opinions.68 This state-
ment is not effective, however, for two reasons. First, the note cannot
overcome the implications of the rule's language. Although the Advi-
sory Committee's note can aid in the interpretation of a rule, 6 9 the
note cannot change the meaning of the rule itself.70
Second, the Advisory Committee's note does not take into account
the interplay between FRAP 32.1 and FRAP 47. FRAP 47 authorizes
courts to promulgate local rules. 71 As local circuit rules developed,
conflicts between those rules and the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure began to emerge.7 2 Thus, when FRAP 47 was amended in 1995,
the Advisory Committee stated in its note that local circuit rules "may
not bar any practice that these rules explicitly or implicitly permit."
73
Local rules providing for the issuance of nonprecedential opinions did
not contravene the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure when the fed-
eral rules were silent on nonprecedential opinions; however, now that
FRAP 32.1 addresses nonprecedential opinions, the local and national
trict judges and one circuit judge. Id. Certain cases would be routed to these
panels for decision. Id. An aggrieved party could petition the court of appeals to
hear the case. Id. The Commission did not address the precedential value of
DCAP opinions, but presumably they would not be binding on the circuit because
they would not have been decided by a circuit panel.
67. Sloan, supra note 3, at 725.
68. FED. R. App. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note.
69. Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1946).
70. E.g., Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1358 n.12 (1st
Cir. 1995) ("[T]he Comment [to a rule] cannot substantively change the text of the
Rule."). In that case, the court refused to limit local rulemaking power based on
language in a comment that did not appear in the rule itself. Id. at 1365.
71. FED. R. App. P. 47.
72. Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Lo-
cal Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7-24 (1997) (offering
examples of local circuit rules in conflict with the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure).
73. FED. R. App. P. 47 advisory committee's note (1995 amend.) (emphasis added).
The note accompanying FRAP 47 is different from that accompanying FRAP 32.1
in that the FRAP 47 Advisory Committee's note explains the intent of the rule,
whereas the note accompanying FRAP 32.1 attempts to change the meaning of
the rule's language. Sloan, supra note 3, at 726 n.78.
[Vol. 86:895
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
rules must be read together. Because FRAP 32.1 permits citation of
nonprecedential opinions, that must mean that their issuance does
not contravene the national rules. It would be contradictory for the
national rules either expressly or implicitly to prohibit the issuance of
nonprecedential opinions while simultaneously authorizing citation of
them. Thus, by operation of FRAP 47, the implication of FRAP 32.1 is
that local rules authorizing the designation of opinions as non-
precedential are valid. 74
B. FRAP 32.1 Preserves Inconsistent Local Rules Governing
Issuance of Nonprecedential Opinions.
By lifting the citation restrictions, the rule has formalized and in-
stitutionalized on a national level a new substratum of appellate au-
thority in the federal system.7 5 In one sense, the rule's recognition of
this layer of authority does not change anything because this layer
has existed for some number of years.76 But the lack of uniform proce-
dures for the issuance of nonprecedential opinions creates confusion
and unnecessary inconsistency in the federal circuits.
Local rules governing the issuance of nonprecedential opinions are
inconsistent across circuits in a number of respects, 77 as I have de-
scribed below.
1. The presumptions favoring or disfavoring issuance of
nonprecedential opinions
The circuits' local rules create varying presumptions regarding the
issuance of precedential and nonprecedential opinions. The First 78
and Fifth79 Circuits' rules create an express presumption in favor of
precedential opinions, providing that precedential opinions will be is-
sued unless certain criteria are met. The Fourth,80 Ninth,81 and Elev-
enth8 2 Circuits' rules create an express presumption against the
74. Sloan, supra note 3, at 726.
75. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
76. See Hannon, supra note 32, at 207 (tracing the history of nonprecedential opin-
ions from 1964 forward).
77. A chart highlighting the differences among circuit rules relating to nonpreceden-
tial opinions appears in Appendix A infra.
78. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(1), available at http://www.cal.uscourts.gov/files/rules/
rulebook.pdf.
79. 5TH Cm. R. 47.5.2.
80. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a), available at http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/pdf/rules.pdf.
81. 9TH CIR. R. 36-2, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov (follow "FRAP & Local
Circuit Rules" and then select "Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP) &
Local Circuit Rules-July 2007 version"). In the Ninth Circuit, the label "opinion"
is reserved for precedential dispositions; nonprecedential decisions are called
memoranda, and all other types of dispositions are called orders. 9TH CIR. R. 36-
1.
82. 11TH CR. R. 36-2.
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issuance of precedential opinions, providing that precedential opinions
will be issued only if certain criteria are met. The Seventh,83
Eighth,84 and Federal8 5 Circuits have policies designed to limit the
number of precedential opinions issued, thereby creating implied pre-
sumptions against the issuance of precedential opinions. The remain-
ing circuits-the Second,8 6 Third,87 Sixth,88 Tenth,89 and District of
Columbia9O Circuits-are neutral; their rules do not contain provi-
sions that expressly or implicitly either favor or disfavor the issuance
of nonprecedential opinions.
2. The effect of content
In most, but not all, circuits, the content of an opinion is a factor
affecting whether it is issued as precedential or nonprecedential.
Seven circuits-the Fourth,9 1 Fifth,92 Sixth,93 Eighth,94 Ninth,95 Dis-
trict of Columbia,96 and Federal9 7 Circuits-provide for issuance of a
precedential opinion when specific content requirements, such as al-
tering or modifying an existing rule of law, are satisfied. The First
Circuit's rule98 is to the same effect. Because of that circuit's pre-
sumption in favor of precedential opinions, however, the rule is stated
in the reverse such that an opinion will be published unless it fails to
83. 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(a), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Rules/rules.pdf
(stating a policy to avoid unnecessary opinions).
84. 8TH CIR. APP. I(4) (providing that an opinion should be published when specific
criteria are satisfied, thus suggesting that all other opinions should not be
published).
85. FED. CIR. IOP 10(4) (announcing the court's policy of limiting precedent to dispo-
sitions meeting specific criteria).
86. 2D CiR. R. 32.1(a).
87. 3D CIR. IOP 5.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf.
88. 6TH CIR. R. 206(a), available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/rules-and_
procedures/pdf/rules2004.pdf.
89. 10TH CIR. R. 36.1, 36.2, available at http://www.calO.uscourts.gov/downloads/
2008_.Rules.pdf. The Tenth Circuit rules do contain one provision that favors is-
suance of precedential opinions in limited circumstances. If the disposition of a
subsidiary tribunal has been published, the Tenth Circuit "ordinarily designates
its disposition for publication." 10TH CIR. R. 36-2.
90. D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(1), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov (select "Rules &
Operating Procedures" and then select "Circuit Rules"). The rule provides that
the court's policy is to publish opinions in cases of general interest to the public.
Id. Because this does not create a presumption either for or against the issuance
of nonprecedential opinions, I characterize the rule as neutral.
91. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a).
92. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1.
93. 6TH CIR. R. 206(a).
94. 8TH CIR. APP. I(4).
95. 9TH CIR. R. 36-2.
96. D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2).
97. FED. CIR. IOP 10(4).
98. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(1).
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meet specific content requirements. The remaining circuits-the Sec-
ond,99 Third,100 Seventh,lOl Tenth,102 and EleventhlO3 Circuits-do
not have rules setting forth specific content-based criteria justifying
issuance of a precedential opinion; instead, their rules contain general
provisions stating, in essence, that decisions with precedential value
will be issued as precedential opinions.
3. The necessity of a unanimous decision in the case
Most circuits' rules do not specify whether a panel's decision in the
underlying case must be unanimous for the panel to issue a non-
precedential opinion. The local rules in seven circuits-the Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, District of Columbia, and Federal
Circuits-make no mention of whether an opinion must be unanimous
to be nonprecedential. The Third Circuit specifically provides that
nonprecedential opinions may be issued "without regard to whether
the panel's decision is unanimous."o4 By contrast, the First 10 5 and
Second 106 Circuits require an opinion to be unanimous to be issued as
nonprecedential. The three remaining circuits-the Fifth,107
Sixth,108 and Ninth1O9-. take the existence of concurring or dissenting
opinions into consideration when deciding whether to issue an opinion
as nonprecedential.
99. 2D CIR. R. 32.1(a) (providing for issuance of so-called summary orders when no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by a precedential opinion).
100. 3D CIR. IOP 5.2 (providing that an opinion is designated as precedential when it
has precedential value).
101. 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(a) (providing only that the court's policy is "to avoid issuing un-
necessary opinions"). Interestingly, before FRAP 32.1 necessitated a change in
the Seventh Circuit's citation rules, the circuit had specific criteria for publica-
tion similar to the criteria used by the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Federal Circuits. 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1) (2006) (rescinded
effective Jan. 1, 2007). It is not clear why the court eliminated these guidelines
for methods of disposition in the face of FRAP 32.1, but that is what the circuit
did, in addition to including a policy of avoiding unnecessary opinions.
102. 10TH CIR. R. 36.1 (calling for issuance of a nonprecedential opinion when a "case
does not require application of new points of law that would make the decision a
valuable precedent").
103. 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 6 (providing that opinions with "no precedential value
are not published").
104. 3D CIR. IOP 5.3.
105. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(2). The First Circuit has an exception permitting a non-
precedential opinion even in a case that is not unanimous if all judges on the
panel agree not to publish the opinion. Id.
106. 2D CIR. R. 32.1(a).
107. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1 (providing that opinions "may" be published if "accompanied by
a concurring or dissenting opinion").
108. 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(4) (listing the existence of separate opinions as a factor to be
considered in the publication decision).
109. 9TH CIR. R. 36-2(g) (calling for publication when there are separate opinions but
only if the author of a separate opinion so requests).
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4. The effect of the nature of the disposition
Another variation among circuit rules concerns the effect of the na-
ture of the disposition, e.g., affirmance or reversal of the decision be-
low, on whether the opinion will be issued as nonprecedential. The
rules in nine circuits-the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh,1 1 0 Eighth,
Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits-say nothing about
whether the type of disposition affects an opinion's precedential sta-
tus. The Third Circuit specifically provides that an opinion may be
issued as nonprecedential regardless of the nature of the disposi-
tion.111 The remaining three circuits consider the nature of the dispo-
sition. The Sixth Circuit lists reversal as one factor it takes into
account in deciding whether to issue a precedential opinion,112
whereas the District of Columbia Circuit issues a precedential opinion
if it reverses or affirms a published agency or district court decision on
different grounds than those upon which the lower tribunal relied.113
In the Fifth Circuit, an opinion "may" be published if it "reverses the
decision below or affirms it upon other grounds."114
5. The process for deciding the status of an opinion
Presumably, the panel that decides the case also decides whether
the opinion is precedential or nonprecedential, but four circuits-the
Seventh,115 Ninth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits-do not
so specify in their rules. The First,116 Second,11 7 and Fifthll8 Circuits
require the panel to be unanimous in its decision regarding the prece-
dential status of the opinion, whereas the Thirdl1 9 and Eleventh12o
Circuits require only a majority of the panel. The Fourth Circuit pro-
110. This is another change in the Seventh Circuit's rules post-FRAP 32.1. See supra
note 101. The prior rule included a provision that "[a] published opinion will be
filed when the decision ... (v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an
order when the lower court or agency has published an opinion supporting the
judgment or order." 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)(1)(v) (2006) (rescinded effective Jan. 1,
2007).
111. 3D CIR. IOP 5.3.
112. 6TH CIR. R. 206(a)(5) (providing that reversal is a consideration "unless: (A) the
reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or, (B) the reversal is a
remand (without further comment) to the district court of a case reversed or re-
manded by the Supreme Court").
113. D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2)(F).
114. 5TH CIR. 47.5.1.
115. Under the Seventh Circuit's pre-FRAP 32.1 rule, a majority of the panel deciding
the case determined whether to issue a nonprecedential opinion. 7TH CIR. R.
53(d)(1) (2006) (rescinded effective Jan. 1, 2007).
116. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(2).
117. 2D CIR. R. 32.1(a).
118. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.2.
119. 3D CIR. IOP 5.1.
120. 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 6.
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vides for publication of an opinion upon a determination, by "the au-
thor or a majority of the joining judges," that at least one of the
publication criteria has been satisfied. 12 1 The Sixth Circuit publishes
upon the request of any panel member, 12 2 and the Eighth 123 and Fed-
eral 12 4 Circuits' rules provide that the panel makes the decision with-
out specifying whether that decision must be unanimous.
6. The procedures for reissuing a nonprecedential opinion as
precedential
A final area of inconsistency concerns procedures for converting
nonprecedential opinions into precedential opinions. The local rules of
five circuits-the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth-do not ad-
dress the process for requesting that a nonprecedential opinion be
made precedential.
The remaining circuits have rules that vary regarding the persons
entitled to request reissuance, the timing of the request, the format of
the opinion upon reissuance, and the bases for granting such a re-
quest. In the First Circuit, any party or interested person may move
for reissuance of an opinion.12 5 In the Fourth, 126 Eighth, 127 and Elev-
enth128 Circuits, only parties or their counsel may request that a non-
precedential opinion be made precedential. The Seventh,
1 29 Ninth,130
121. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a).
122. 6TH CIR. R. 206(b).
123. 8TH CIR. IOP § IV(B), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/newrules/coa/IOP.
pdf.
124. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(b), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/RulesDear
Readerl2.03.071.pdf.
125. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(2)(D). It is not clear who an interested person other than a
party would be. This rule could be construed broadly to allow virtually any per-
son to move for reissuance, or it could be construed more narrowly to restrict
motions for reissuance to persons with some direct interest in a case.
126. 4TH CIR. R. 36(b). The Fourth Circuit's rule actually says that "[clounsel," not
parties, may request reclassification of an opinion. Id. An earlier portion of the
rule, however, says that nonprecedential dispositions are for the benefit of"coun-
sel, the parties, and the lower court or agency." Id. Thus, the later reference to
counsel in the context of motions to reclassify opinions appears to be limited to
counsel acting on behalf of the parties in a case resolved by a nonprecedential
opinion and not a reference to all counsel. It would be odd indeed for the rule to
permit any attorney acting as counsel in any case to move for reissuance of an
opinion but not allow the parties themselves to do so.
127. 8TH CIR. IOP § V(B). Like the Fourth Circuit's rule, the Eighth Circuit's rule
also states that "[clounsel" may move for reissuance, which presumably refers to
counsel for parties to the case and which presumably also includes the parties
themselves. Id.
128. 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 6.
129. 7TH CiR. R. 32.1(c).
130. 9TH CIR. R. 36-4. Although this rule does not use the exact phrase "any person,"
it leaves the parties who may request publication unspecified; thus, the rule im-
plies that any person may request publication.
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District of Columbia,131 and Federal132 Circuits allow any person to
make such a request, although two of these circuits have notice re-
quirements directed toward persons who might be affected by the reis-
suance of an opinion. In the Ninth Circuit, parties must be served
with requests for reissuance and are permitted to notify the court of
any objections to reissuance. 13 3 The Federal Circuit's rule provides
that
[t]he requester must notify the court and the parties of any case that person
knows to be pending that would be determined or affected by reissuance as
precedential. Parties to pending cases who have a stake in the outcome of a
decision to make precedential must be given an opportunity to respond.
1 3 4
The timing of the request also varies. In the Eleventh Circuit,135
the request must be made prior to the issuance of the mandate. In the
District of Columbia Circuit,13 6 the time limit is thirty days after the
judgment, whereas the Ninth137 and Federal13 8 Circuits allow sixty
days after issuance of the opinion. The First, Fourth, Seventh, and
Eighth Circuits do not specify a time limit for making a request.
Additionally, the format of the opinion may vary. In the Federal
Circuit, if a request to reissue is granted, "the opinion or order may be
revised as appropriate.' 13 9 The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, is the
only circuit specifically to say that the content of a reissued opinion
will not be changed.140 The others that expressly authorize reissu-
ance-the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits-do not specify
whether the opinion will be reissued in its original form or subject to
alteration.
Although only the District of Columbia Circuit141 formally discour-
ages requests to reissue opinions, the First,14 2 Fourth, 1 43 Seventh,144
Ninth,145 and Federal146 Circuits all require a statement of reasons or
a showing of good cause that suggests that the requests will not rou-
131. D.C. CIR. R. 36(d).
132. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
133. 9TH CiR. R. 36-4.
134. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
135. 11TH CIR. R. 36-3.
136. D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). If a timely petition for rehearing is submitted, the deadline for
requesting publication becomes thirty days after the court's action on the rehear-
ing petition. Id.
137. 9TH Cia. R. 36-4.
138. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
139. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
140. 4TH CIR. R. 36(b).
141. D.C. CIR. R. 36(d).
142. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(2)(D).
143. 4TH CiR. R. 36(b).
144. 7TH Cm. R. 32.1(c).
145. 9TH CiR. R. 36-4.
146. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(e).
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tinely be granted. Only the Eighth Circuit 147 permits a motion with-
out requiring any particular showing to justify the reissuance,
although presumably some justification would have to support the
request.
Under these rules, a person litigating a case or advising a client in
the First or Seventh Circuits could petition at any time to convert a
nonprecedential opinion into a precedential one to gain an advantage
in a current legal matter. It is unclear how, if at all, the courts will
consider the passage of time in ruling on such a motion; a person
might move for reissuance immediately after becoming aware of a
helpful nonprecedential opinion, even if the opinion has existed for
some number of years. In the Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits,
only parties may request reissuance, but that advantages institutional
parties, such as the Department of Justice, that litigate many cases.
Such institutional parties can identify nonprecedential opinions that
favor their positions and, at least in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits,
request reissuance at any time.
While these differences may not seem significant when considered
individually, in the aggregate, they reflect very different policies re-
garding the development of precedential law among the circuits. The
overall presumption regarding issuance of precedential or non-
precedential opinions, the types of dispositions meriting precedential
treatment, and the need for judges to gain a majority or act affirma-
tively for opinions to be issued as precedential or nonprecedential all
contribute to the atmosphere affecting the degree to which a given cir-
cuit encourages issuance of nonprecedential opinions.148 The effects
of the differences in persons eligible to request reissuance of non-
precedential opinions and the time limits on the requests have special
potential to affect the development of the law. If nonprecedential
opinions continue to account for 84% of dispositions on the merits,1
49
the procedures and criteria for their issuance should be subject to uni-
147. 8TH CIR. IOP § IV(B).
148. Statistics show that the District of Columbia Circuit, which does not have a pre-
sumption for either precedential or nonprecedential opinions, issued the fewest
nonprecedential opinions (59.9%) in the twelve months ending September 30,
2006. TABLE S-3, supra note 12, at 52. During the same time period, the First
Circuit, which has the strongest presumption in favor of issuing precedential
opinions, was a close second with 61.7% of its opinions issued as nonprecedential.
Id. The Fourth Circuit, with a presumption in favor of nonprecedential opinions,
issued the most (93.7%). Id. What is not clear is whether the rules encourage
relative reliance on nonprecedential opinions or whether tendencies toward use
of nonprecedential opinions inspired the choice of language in the rules.
149. Id.
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form national standards, but FRAP 32.1 in its present form maintains
these inconsistencies.
C. FRAP 32.1 Perpetuates Confusion Regarding the
Authoritative Value of Nonprecedential Opinions.
In addition to preserving inconsistencies among local circuit rules
governing nonprecedential opinions, FRAP 32.1 also perpetuates the
confusion over the position of nonprecedential opinions in the hierar-
chy of decisional law. As presently understood, the hierarchy of prece-
dent in the federal system is as follows: Federal district court opinions
are not binding on any tribunal;15o federal appellate decisions are
binding on all appellate panels within the circuit (unless overruled en
banc) 15 1 and on all subsidiary tribunals (e.g., federal district courts
150. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that federal trial
court opinions are not binding precedent); Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that "there is no such thing as
'the law of the district,'" such that federal district court opinions are not binding
in later cases); Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1143, 1179
(2006) (noting that federal district court opinions do not bind later courts).
151. Every circuit follows the law of the circuit rule. See, e.g., Brubaker Amusement
Co. v. United States, 304 F.3d 1349, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Brooks v. Walls, 279
F.3d 518, 522-23 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 279 F.3d 226, 233 &
n.4 (3d Cir. 2002); Walker v. S. Co. Servs., 279 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2002);
United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2002); Valentine v. Francis, 270
F.3d 1032, 1035 (6th Cir. 2001); Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171; Martin v. Medtronic,
Inc., 254 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir. 2001); Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't
of State, 251 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301,
312 n.4 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pollard, 249 F.3d 738, 739 (8th Cir.
2001); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 912 n.8 (10th Cir. 1997); In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 123 F.3d 695, 697 n.2 (1st Cir. 1997). See generally Alan R.
Gilbert, Annotation, In Banc Proceedings in Federal Courts of Appeals, 37 A.L.R.
FED. 274, § 5 (1978 & Supp. 2007) (collecting cases).
Exceptions to the law of the circuit rule exist. Federal appellate panels are
not bound by prior panel decisions if later rulings affect the validity of the prior
opinion, such as a later ruling by the Supreme Court, the circuit court sitting en
banc, or a state's courts (on questions of state law). See, e.g., Cooper v. Cent. &
Sw. Servs., 271 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that, unless a state's
courts have changed the law, a prior panel decision on a question of state law is
binding on a later panel); Martin, 254 F.3d at 577 (recognizing that a Supreme
Court decision may render a prior panel decision invalid); United States v. Doe,
819 F.2d 206, 209 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining circumstances under which a
panel opinion undermined by a later en bane opinion can be reexamined).
Circuit courts have both disregarded and modified the law of the circuit rule
from time to time. The rule has been disregarded in unusual circumstances. See,
e.g., N.C. Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (4th Cir. 1977) (deter-
mining that circumstances preventing en banc review freed the panel from the
obligation to follow a prior panel opinion). But see In re Charleston v. United
States, 444 F.2d 504, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing to disregard the law of the
circuit rule even though en banc consideration was impossible).
The rule has been modified in more than half of the circuits. At least seven
circuits allow abbreviated procedures under which a panel can overrule an earlier
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and bankruptcy courts) within the circuit;1 52 and United States Su-
preme Court decisions, which are not binding on the Supreme Court
itself, are binding on all subsidiary tribunals in the federal system. 1
53
Nonprecedential opinions do not fit neatly into this hierarchy of
authority. Because they are issued by circuit court panels, they
should be binding on later panels and lower tribunals within the cir-
cuit under the law of the circuit rule. But clearly they are not; if they
were binding, they would not be nonprecedential. When local circuit
rules prohibited citation to nonprecedential opinions, these opinions
were, in essence, not "authority" or "sources" at all; they had no au-
thoritative value whatsoever because they did not exist, at least prece-
panel opinion as long as the overruling opinion is circulated to the full court and
the members of the full court do not vote to hear the case en banc. 7TH CIR. R.
40(e) (allowing a panel to overrule a prior panel opinion as long as the opinion is
circulated to the full court and a majority do not vote to hear the issue en banc);
United States v. Brutus, 505 F.3d 80, 87 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) (overruling a prior
panel opinion after circulating the opinion to all active members of the court and
obtaining acquiescence to the change); United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127,
1130 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006) (overruling several prior panel opinions after circulat-
ing the opinion to all active members of the court and obtaining acquiescence to
the change); Gallagher v. Wilton Enters., Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124 n.4 (1st Cir.
1992) (noting that in the rare instance when it is clear that a prior panel decision
was wrongly decided, a later panel will overrule the earlier panel using an infor-
mal procedure by which the overruling opinion is circulated to all active judges);
Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations U.S.A. Ltd. v. Morts, 921 F.2d 775, 779 n.5
(8th Cir. 1990) (overruling a prior panel opinion after noting that the opinion had
been circulated to the full court en banc); Dornbusch v. Comm'r, 860 F.2d 611,
612 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the panel was authorized to depart from
a prior panel opinion because the opinion in this case was circulated to all active
judges, with attention called to the departure from the prior precedent, with no
objection or request to hear the case en banc); Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265,
268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining that the portion of the opinion that resolved
a conflict between earlier panel opinions had been approved by the full court).
These exceptional procedures raise questions about the degree to which the
federal appellate courts feel constrained by the law of the circuit rule. They show
that the law of the circuit rule is a fairly elastic concept subject to modification by
the courts as necessary. Additionally, the fact that these modified procedures
originated both through case law and local rules supports the conclusion that the
courts can modify the law of the circuit rule both acting in their judicial capacity
and acting with delegated legislative authority through procedural rules. See in-
fra section IV.B.
152. One exception to this rule concerns cases within the jurisdiction of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. This court's jurisdiction is based
on subject matter, not geography. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000). Accordingly, on
matters within the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, district courts across the coun-
try are bound by the Federal Circuit's opinions.
153. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576-77 (2003) (overruling Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). As the Supreme Court has explained, adherence
to precedent is the preferred course of action, but "when governing decisions are
unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow
precedent."' Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (quoting Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)).
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dentially.154 The only way to keep nonprecedential opinions of no
value is to make them precedentially nonexistent by restricting cita-
tion.15 5 As some circuits gradually liberalized citation policies, non-
precedential opinions in those circuits acquired an ill-defined
authoritative value as persuasive or nonbinding precedent, remaining
of no value in those circuits that retained strict no-citation rules.156
When FRAP 32.1 took away the option of restricting citation, it
moved all nonprecedential opinions out of the non-authority category
and into a category of authority with uncertain value. FRAP 32.1 does
not define the weight or status of nonprecedential opinions, as the Ad-
visory Committee's note emphasizes.157 The circuits use their local
rules to exempt, to varying degrees, nonprecedential opinions from the
usual rules of precedent. By default, therefore, FRAP 32.1 accepts the
local rules' definitions of the weight of nonprecedential opinions.
All circuits except the District of Columbia Circuit at least implic-
itly designate nonprecedential opinions as nonbinding. 5 8 The cir-
cuits characterize the authoritative value of nonprecedential opinions
in three ways. The First,15 9 Tenth,160 Eleventh,161 and Federal1
6 2
154. Nonprecedential opinions existed as a factual matter, as evidenced by exceptions
to no-citation rules allowing citation for purposes of establishing the law of the
case or res judicata, but they did not exist legally as precedent. See infra note
156 (discussing pre-FRAP 32.1 citation rules).
155. As Judge Kozinski has explained, allowing citation of nonprecedential opinions
effectively requires judges to treat all the opinions they write as precedential.
Hearing, supra note 7, at 13.
156. Compare these examples of pre-FRAP 32.1 local rules as they existed in 2004:
First Circuit Rule 32.3 permitted, but disfavored, citation to nonprecedential
opinions for persuasive value; Second Circuit Rule 0.23 authorized nonpreceden-
tial opinions and prohibited citation to nonprecedential opinions "before this or
any other court" but did not address the opinions' authoritative value; and Fed-
eral Circuit Rule 47.6 authorized nonprecedential opinions and prohibited cita-
tion to nonprecedential opinions "as precedent," but did not otherwise define
their authoritative value. See Sloan, supra note 3, at 716-17 n.25. Many of these
rules remain unchanged with respect to the authoritative value of nonpreceden-
tial opinions, although the citation restrictions have been removed per FRAP
32.1. For a list of pre-FRAP 32.1 citation rules, see id. and Barnett, From Anas-
tasoff to Hart, supra note 61, at 4-5.
157. FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 advisory committee's note.
158. See infra notes 159-85 and accompanying text.
159. The First Circuit considers unpublished dispositions "for their persuasive value
but not as binding precedent." 1ST CIR. R. 32.1.0.
160. 10TH CIR. R. 32.1(A) ("Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but may be
cited for their persuasive value.").
161. 11TH CIR. R. 36-2 ("Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent,
but they may be cited as persuasive authority."); see also 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P.
6 ("Although unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive authority, they are
not considered binding precedent.").
162. FED. CIR. R. 32.1(d) ("The court may refer to a nonprecedential disposition in an
opinion or order and may look to a nonprecedential disposition for guidance or
persuasive reasoning, but will not give one of its own nonprecedential disposi-
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Circuits specifically state that nonprecedential opinions have only
persuasive value. Whatever the meaning of "persuasive value," it is at
least clear that these circuits do not consider nonprecedential opinions
binding authority.
In contrast, six circuits-the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth-do not expressly define nonprecedential opinions
as persuasive but do expressly characterize them as some form of non-
precedent, at least with respect to nonprecedential opinions issued af-
ter January 1, 2007. Specifically, these circuits define nonpreceden-
tial opinions as "not hav[ing] precedential effect" (Second Circuit163 ),
"not... precedents that bind the court" (Third Circuit164), "not prece-
dent" (Fifth,165 Eighth,166 and Ninth167 Circuits), and "not treated as
precedents" (Seventh Circuit 168 ). The Seventh Circuit's local rules
169
and the Third's Circuit's internal operating procedures170 further pro-
vide that only published opinions constitute the law of the circuit.
This necessarily means that opinions not treated or regarded as prece-
tions the effect of binding precedent."); see also FED. CIR. IOP 9(8) ("Nonpreceden-
tial opinions and orders and Rule 36 judgments shall not be employed as
precedent by this court, nor be cited as precedent by counsel.").
163. 2D CIR. R. 32.1(b) ('[Slummary order[s] do not have precedential effect.").
164. 3D CIR. IOP 5.7 ("The court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opin-
ions as authority. Such opinions are not regarded as precedents that bind the
court ... ."). Note that the rule refers to the court's practice, but does not estab-
lish a rule for parties. Before the adoption of FRAP 32.1, this was seen as giving
tacit approval to parties to cite nonprecedential opinions. Barnett, From Anas-
tasoff to Hart, supra note 61, at 5-6 n.25.
165. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. In the Fifth Circuit, 1996 is the dividing line for treatment of
nonprecedential opinions. Those 'issued before January 1, 1996[ ], are precedent.
Although every opinion believed to have precedential value is published, an un-
published opinion may be cited pursuant to FED. R. App. P. 32.1(a)." 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.3. "Unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996[ 1, are not pre-
cedent" but may be cited pursuant to FRAP 32.1. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
166. 8TH CIR. R. 32.1A ("Unpublished opinions ... are not precedent."), available at
http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/newrules/coalocalrules.pdf. Nonprecedential opin-
ions "issued on or after January 1, 2007, may be cited in accordance with FRAP
32.1," but those issued earlier "generally should not be cited." Id. The rule con-
tinues, however, by saying that parties may cite an unpublished opinion (presum-
ably a reference to an opinion issued before January 1, 2007, since those issued
after that date may freely be cited) "if the opinion has persuasive value on a ma-
terial issue." Id.
167. 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a) ('Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not
precedent . . ").
168. In the Seventh Circuit, so-called orders "are not published ... and are not treated
as precedents," whereas so-called opinions "are published ... and constitute the
law of the circuit." 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(b).
169. Id.
170. 3D CIR. IOP 9.1 ('It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a
precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel
overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a previous panel. Court en
banc consideration is required to do so.").
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dent do not bind later panels. Notwithstanding any technical distinc-
tions among an opinion that is not a precedent, one that is not a
precedent that binds the court, and one that is not treated as prece-
dent, the clear import of these circuits' rules is that nonprecedential
opinions are not binding. Whether, and to what degree, nonpreceden-
tial opinions from these circuits have persuasive value is not clear
from the rules.
In the third category are circuits in which the authoritative value
of nonprecedential opinions is unclear from the local rules. The
Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits fall into this category.
The implication of the rules in two of these circuits is that non-
precedential opinions are not binding, but the rules do not expressly
address the issue. In the Fourth Circuit, nonprecedential opinions is-
sued before January 1, 2007, may be cited if a party thinks the opinion
has precedential value (whatever that means), but there is no mention
of the weight of nonprecedential opinions issued after January 1,
2007.171 In accordance with FRAP 32.1, such opinions may be cited,
but nothing in the local rules addresses their authoritative value.1
7 2
Although these rules can be read to imply that all Fourth Circuit opin-
ions have precedential value, with citation to pre-FRAP 32.1 non-
precedential opinions disfavored and to post-FRAP 32.1
nonprecedential opinions unrestricted, 1 73 the Fourth Circuit has re-
peatedly stated in the pre-FRAP 32.1 context that its nonprecedential
opinions are not binding precedent. 174 Given this treatment of non-
precedential opinions issued before January 1, 2007, it seems likely
that the Fourth Circuit will continue to treat its nonprecedential opin-
ions as nonbinding.
In the Sixth Circuit, the rules provide that "[rieported panel opin-
ions are binding on subsequent panels" and cannot be overruled with-
out en banc consideration. 17 5 Although the Sixth Circuit says nothing
171. 4TH CIR. R. 32.1.
172. The Fourth Circuit's local rules contain no specific definition of the weight of non-
precedential opinions issued after January 1, 2007, but for those issued before
that date, citation is disfavored. Id. ("If a party believes, nevertheless, that an
unpublished disposition of this Court issued prior to January 1, 2007, has prece-
dential value in relation to a material issue in a case and that there is no pub-
lished opinion that would serve as well, such disposition may be cited. . . ."). The
implication of the rules is that post-FRAP 32.1 decisions are not binding, but
nothing says so directly.
173. Sarah E. Ricks, A Modest Proposal for Regulating Unpublished, Non-Precedential
Federal Appellate Opinions While Courts and Litigants Adapt to Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1, 9 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 17, 24 n.32 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Ricks, A Modest Proposal].
174. E.g., United States v. Adams, 39 F. App'x 36, 38 (4th Cir. 2002); Mueller v.
Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 579 n.15 (4th Cir. 1999); Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113,
1118 (4th Cir. 1996).
175. 6TH CIR. R. 206(c).
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about the weight of nonprecedential opinions, the implication of the
rule regarding reported decisions 17 6 is that nonprecedential opinions
do not bind subsequent panels and do not require en banc considera-
tion to be overruled.
The District of Columbia Circuit's rule is especially tricky. The di-
viding line in this circuit is January 1, 2002; nonprecedential opinions
issued before that date "are not to be cited as precedent," and those
decided on or after that date "may be cited as precedent."'17 7 Although
nonprecedential opinions may be cited "as precedent,"1 78 "a panel's de-
cision to issue [a nonprecedential opinion] means that the panel sees
no precedential value in that disposition."179 What does this mean? A
nonprecedential opinion may be cited as precedent, but the panel that
issued it saw no precedential value in it. Aside from being contradic-
tory, these rules provide no guidance on how litigants or later panels
should treat the nonprecedential opinion. Some other circuits' rules
specifically say nonprecedential opinions are "not precedent" as a way
of saying that they are not binding.180 For the District of Columbia
Circuit to allow citation as precedent then implies that nonpreceden-
tial opinions are binding and subject to the law of the circuit rule. But
another way to read the rule is that precedent is a broad category of
all previously decided opinions and that binding precedent is only a
subset. By not specifying that nonprecedential opinions are binding
precedent, Local Rule 32.1(b)(1) allows, but does not require, the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit to treat nonprecedential opinions as binding.
The District of Columbia Circuit may have been attempting to distin-
guish cases cited for their substance in later, unrelated cases (i.e., pre-
cedent, whether binding or persuasive) from the "same case"
exceptions that all circuits provided to their no-citation rules (i.e., law
of the case, res judicata, etc.). It is not possible to determine the in-
tent of the rule with certainty based solely upon its language.
The District of Columbia Circuit's treatment of its nonprecedential
opinions does not clear up the confusion. Few cases from the District
of Columbia Circuit discuss the authoritative value of nonprecedential
opinions, and only one of those was decided under the present itera-
tion of the local rule. In Consumer Electronics Association v. FCC, the
court rejected the reasoning in an earlier decision by noting that the
prior opinion was a "nonbinding unpublished order."' 8 ' It went on,
however, to say that, because part of the Consumer Electronics Associ-
ation decision rejected a prior statement of law, it was "considered
176. See id.
177. D.C. CIR. R. 32.1(b)(1).
178. Id.
179. D.C. CIR. R. 36(c)(2).
180. See supra notes 163-70 and accompanying text.
181. 347 F.3d 291, 297 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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separately and approved by the full court"18 2 using a modification of
the en banc procedure that the court has authorized for overruling
prior panel opinions.18 3 In other words, the court treated the non-
precedential opinion the same way it would have treated a preceden-
tial opinion. Consumer Electronics Association was decided in 2003,
well before FRAP 32.1 went into effect, but the District of Columbia
Circuit's rule was the same in 2003 as it is today. This opinion sug-
gests that the prior nonprecedential opinion was, in some sense, bind-
ing upon the court to the extent that the approval of the full court was
necessary to reject it.184 Thus, although the common wisdom is that
nonprecedential opinions are not binding in any circuit, 185 at least in
the District of Columbia Circuit, the rules and cases create some un-
certainty in that regard.
The variations in the circuits' rules regarding the authoritative
value of nonprecedential opinions and the indeterminacy of the lan-
guage used to define that value are problematic. They make it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to determine the weight of nonprecedential
opinions. As one commentator on the proposed version of FRAP 32.1
explained:
No one knows what to do with unpublished circuit decisions. ... [T]hey re-
present a limbo of pseudo-precedent that is not binding but yet has more effect
than merely legal advocacy. The respect they are given varies from near zero
to that given binding precedent; they may be treated like a law review article,
a Federal Supplement decision from another circuit, or a published opinion of
the authoring court itself.186
The problem of lack of consistency in the treatment of non-
precedential opinions as a category of authority is significant. First,
as noted above, nonprecedential opinions may still constitute the law
of the circuit within the District of Columbia Circuit; their status is
simply unclear under both the language of the rule and the courts'
application of it.
182. Id. The decision also rejected dicta from a prior published opinion. Id. Rejection
of such dicta also should not have required review by the full court.
183. This modification was authorized by the court in Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265,
268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra note 151 (discussing modifications of the en
banc procedure in other circuits).
184. Although the District of Columbia Circuit has also rejected opinions based on
their nonprecedential status, it did so under the pre-2002 rule rather than the
present rule. See, e.g., Slinger Drainage, Inc. v. EPA, 244 F.3d 967, 968 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (stating that a prior unpublished opinion cited by a party did not apply,
and that, "[m]ore importantly," the opinion was not binding precedent); Milton S.
Kronheim & Co. v. District of Columbia, 91 F.3d 193, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating
that the court was bound only by prior published, rather than unpublished,
opinions).
185. See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 7, at 8 (statement of Judge Alito) ("All courts of
appeals agree that unpublished opinions are not binding precedent.").
186. Cooper Letter, supra note 16, at 3.
[Vol. 86:895
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
Beyond that, what exactly does it mean for a prior opinion to be
persuasive, not binding, or not precedent? As Stephen Barnett has
argued, persuasive value is elusive; he sees it as persuasive force
based on the substantive arguments rather than on status derived
from principles of stare decisis. 8 7 Black's Law Dictionary, however,
defines persuasive precedent, as opposed to persuasive authority more
generally, as "precedent that is not binding on a court, but that is enti-
tled to respect and careful consideration."1 8 8 This suggests that, if a
nonprecedential opinion is a persuasive precedent, it is entitled to
some weight by virtue of its status; its substantive merits cannot be
rejected without some sort of explanation. Along the same lines,
Charles Alan Sullivan explains that the meaning of persuasive in the
context of court opinions is different from the meaning of persuasive
when applied to other forms of authority.1 8 9 He suggests that judges,
either consciously or unconsciously, use a sliding scale to assess the
authoritative value of various sources and give some weight to persua-
sive court opinions because of their status. 190 Thus, while "persuasive
precedents can be rejected, . . . they cannot be ignored."19 1 This is
consistent with Larry Alexander's natural model of precedent, under
which the existence of a prior similar opinion is one factor a deci-
sionmaker weighs in deciding how a later case should be resolved, but
not a dispositive factor by itself.19 2 But Frederick Schauer contends
that an argument based on so-called persuasive precedent is not an
argument based on precedent at all: "Only if a rule makes relevant the
result of a previous decision regardless of a decisionmaker's current
belief about the correctness of that decision do we have the kind of
argument from precedent routinely made in law and elsewhere."
19 3
In other words, if a prior decision does not constrain today's deci-
sionmaker by virtue of its status and without regard for the persua-
siveness of its content, it is not precedent at all.1
94
That then leads naturally to the question of what it means when a
prior opinion is not "binding precedent"-or not precedent at all. Is
that the same as having persuasive value, or is it something different?
If an opinion is not precedent at all, it arguably has less weight than
187. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart, supra note 61, at 11.
188. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1215 (8th ed. 2004). Persuasive authority, by contrast,
is defined as "[aluthority that carries some weight but is not binding on a court."
Id. at 143.
189. Sullivan, supra note 150, at 1198-1201.
190. Id. at 1201-03.
191. Id. at 1206.
192. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5-16 (1989).
193. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1987).
194. See Allen, supra note 4, at 570-72 (arguing that a distinction exists between an
argument for similar treatment with an earlier case and an argument based on
precedent).
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an authority that is a persuasive precedent. Authorities that are not
precedents, such as law review articles or treatises, will often be given
less weight than nonbinding precedents, such as opinions from courts
outside the jurisdiction. 1
95
The circuits apparently share this confusion. In the Second Cir-
cuit, the court states in commentary accompanying its rule that deny-
ing nonprecedential opinions "precedential effect does not mean that
the court considers itself free to rule differently in similar cases."
19 6 If
the court feels constrained to rule similarly in later cases, then it
seems that nonprecedential opinions have some indeterminate value
that is less than fully binding, but more than simply persuasive, and
that renders the status of nonprecedential opinions in the Second Cir-
cuit unclear. In the Sixth Circuit, whose rules only implicitly define
nonprecedential opinions as nonbinding, panels have described non-
precedential opinions as "without precedential value,"19 7 as having
"limited precedential force,"1 9 8 and as having "persuasive weight." 199
These various characterizations of nonprecedential opinions create
confusion regarding their authoritative value.
In decisions that have discussed the value of nonprecedential opin-
ions, courts frequently invoke nonprecedential status as a justification
for rejecting nonprecedential opinions, but they often also give an ad-
ditional reason, usually distinguishing the case. 20 0 Sometimes, how-
ever, courts reject prior opinions based solely on their status, even in
circuits that say the opinions are persuasive. 20 ' And although the de-
cisions that discuss the status of nonprecedential opinions are of some
use, courts frequently cite nonprecedential opinions without any dis-
cussion of their weight. Shepard's Federal Citations (Shepard's) in
print form presently includes two hard bound volumes recording cita-
tions to cases published in volumes 1 through 169 of West's Federal
Appendix (Federal Appendix), a reporter that began publication in
2001; these hard bound volumes together comprise 820 pages of Shep-
195. See Sullivan, supra note 150, at 1198-99.
196. 2D CIR. R. 32.1 cmt.
197. Kidd v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 7 F. App'x 483, 489 (6th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a
nonprecedential opinion).
198. McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a nonpreceden-
tial opinion).
199. United States v. Webber, 208 F.3d 545, 551 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (following a non-
precedential opinion).
200. See, e.g., Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021, 1029 (10th Cir. 2004), superseded by
statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 564.1 (West Supp. 2007); United States v. Ad-
ams, 39 F. App'x 36, 38 (4th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d
498, 518 (6th Cir. 2001); Salamalekis v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 221 F.3d 828,
833 (6th Cir. 2000); Mueller v. Angelone, 181 F.3d 557, 579 n.15 (4th Cir. 1999).
201. See, e.g., United States v. Santillana, 109 F. App'x 665, 667 (5th Cir. 2004), va-
cated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1114 (2005); Hain v. Mullin, 324 F.3d 1146, 1148
n.2 (10th Cir. 2003).
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ard's entries cataloguing citations to nonprecedential opinions. 20 2 By
contrast, West's digest topic of COURTS, key number 107 (Operation
and effect in general), a key number categorizing cases addressing the
authoritative value of prior opinions, lists approximately 630 cases
dating back to 1941, far fewer than the number of cases that contain
citations to nonprecedential opinions.
2 03
202. 26 SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS 777-1132 (9th ed. LexisNexis 2006); 27 SHEP-
ARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONs 3-468 (9th ed. LexisNexis 2006). Shepard's Federal Ci-
tations (Shepard's) in print is almost universally considered a dinosaur in legal
research. Interestingly, however, compilation of the data regarding treatment of
cases published in the Federal Appendix is one of the few research tasks most
easily accomplished with the print version of Shepard's. Examination of treat-
ment codes assigned to later cases citing Federal Appendix decisions provides a
snap shot view of how the courts treat these opinions. This research would be
difficult, if not impossible, to do online.
203. A Westlaw search for 106k107 (COURTS topic; key number for Operation and
effect in general), run on September 4, 2007, retrieved 632 cases. Of course, some
cases that discuss the value of nonprecedential opinions could be categorized
under different topics or key numbers, especially if they address the constitution-
ality of the opinions. On the other hand, cases under this key number cover a
variety of topics in addition to the precedential weight of nonprecedential opin-
ions, such as the weight of vacated opinions. Thus, although the comparison be-
tween the number of Shepard's pages and the number of cases under the West
key number is not an exact comparison, the disparity in the volume of cases does
illustrate the fact that courts often cite nonprecedential opinions without discuss-
ing the weight of the opinions. See Robert Timothy Reagan, A Snapshot of Briefs,
Opinions, and Citations in Federal Appeals, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 321 (2006)
(analyzing empirical data regarding citation to nonprecedential opinions in briefs
and opinions).
The uncertainty about the status of nonprecedential opinions also affects legal
research. When later panels reject prior nonprecedential opinions, the non-
precedential opinions may or may not be characterized as "overruled" in Shep-
ard's and KeyCite. Compare the treatment of the following cases. In United
States v. Montanez, 442 F.3d 485, 489-92 (6th Cir. 2006), the court undertook an
extended analysis of Gibbs v. United States, 3 F. App'x 404 (6th Cir. 2001), and
United States v. Coteat, 133 F. App'x 177 (6th Cir. 2005), recognizing the inconsis-
tency among the circuit's nonprecedential opinions and ultimately rejecting both
Gibbs and Coteat as "wrongly decided." Shepard's characterizes Gibbs and Coteat
as "overruled" with red stop sign Shepard's signals, but KeyCite lists them as
"disagreed with" by the later case and assigns yellow status flags. In this in-
stance, it is hard to think of the earlier cases as being anything other than over-
ruled, although the court did not use that precise language. The only reason they
would not be overruled is either because, as nonprecedential opinions, they were
never controlling in the first place or because they cannot be overruled under the
law of the circuit rule (which prevents one panel from overruling another panel's
decision). In this context, KeyCite would not characterize the case as overruled
because the court did not use the term overruled. Nevertheless, another option,
"abrogated by," which merits a red status flag, could have been used instead.
Similarly, in Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 256 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005), the court
"repudiate[d]" statements of dicta in two prior nonprecedential opinions, Es-
kridge v. Konteh, 88 F. App'x 831 (6th Cir. 2004), and Davis v. Burt, 100 F. App'x
340 (6th Cir. 2004), rather than outright overruling them. Shepard's character-
izes Eskridge and Davis as overruled with red stop sign Shepard's signals, but
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No other form of primary authority is given, by virtue of its status,
one weight in one circuit and a different weight in a different circuit.
This affects the legitimacy of the courts; the requirement that courts
give the same weight to the various categories of authority is funda-
mental both to the reality and the perception of fair decisionmak-
ing.20 4 As one judge put it: "Inconsistency is the antithesis of the rule
of law."20 5 Further, the fact that one circuit, by its local rules, can
define a category of authority differently than its sister circuits high-
lights the difficulty of having the weight of authority defined by local
rule. Something as fundamental to the judicial system as the hierar-
chy of authority should not be left to the vagaries of local rules. In-
deed, in the Third Circuit, nonprecedential opinions are addressed
only in internal operating procedures that are not subject to the notice
and comment requirements applicable to local rules.20
6
Of course, one could say that this is splitting hairs-that the terms
used in the local circuit rules are close enough in meaning to convey
basically the same idea. But this is not the case. Lawyers value preci-
sion in language and would certainly question the use of one term in
one part of a statute or contract and a similar, but not identical, term
in another part. Even if the terms used in the rules were close enough
in meaning to convey basically the same idea, it is still unclear exactly
KeyCite lists them as "rejected by" the later case and assigns yellow status flags.
In this instance, it seems like the KeyCite disagreed with characterization would
have been more accurate given that the portions of the opinions that Moore repu-
diated were dicta. Of the treatment code options in Shepard's, "criticized" is
probably a more accurate choice, although overruled is justifiable.
In contrast, both services characterize United States v. Guerrero, 89 F. App'x
140 (10th Cir. 2004), as overruled, and the case shows a red stop sign Shepard's
signal and a red KeyCite status flag. The overruling case is another panel deci-
sion, United States v. Flowers, 464 F.3d 1127, 1130 n.1 (10th Cir. 2006), and the
"overruling" of the prior opinion appears in a footnote: "We have circulated this
opinion to the en banc court pursuant to our rules. Each member of the en banc
court has concurred with our holding [overruling Guererro and several other prec-
edential and nonprecedential opinions]."
Of course, thorough research requires investigation of any Shepard's or
KeyCite negative treatment indicators. But the fact remains that not assigning
nonprecedential opinions a clear position within the hierarchy of decisional law
creates confusion in citator characterizations of the opinions' treatment and has
consequences for legal research. See generally Andrew T. Solomon, Making Un-
published Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems & Legal Malprac-
tice?, 26 Miss. C. L. REv. 185 (2007) (describing research problems that
nonprecedential opinions create).
204. See Pearson, supra note 66, at 1251 (discussing the role of precedent as a tool for
providing judicial accountability and legitimacy by minimizing inconsistency,
standardizing decisions, and dampening variability in the decisionmaking
process).
205. LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
206. For description of the public notice and comment requirements applicable to local
rules, see 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2000) and FRAP 47(a).
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what that idea is.2o7 May nonprecedential opinions truly be disre-
garded based on their status with no substantive consideration? Or
are they are entitled to some degree of deference, even if they are not
binding in the sense of controlling later cases, such that they cannot
be rejected without explanation? The local rules, commentary accom-
panying the rules, and judicial interpretations of the rules do not an-
swer these questions.
Determining the authoritative value of a category of authority,
particularly one used so frequently by the federal appellate courts,
should not be this hard. Members of the public, litigants, and the
courts themselves should know how nonprecedential opinions, as a
group, fit within the hierarchy of decisional law. Consistency in the
treatment of nonprecedential opinions is essential for judicial legiti-
macy, as are uniform procedures for their issuance. It would have
been better for FRAP 32.1 to address these issues head on.
IV. NEXT STEPS FOR FRAP 32.1
FRAP 32.1 is a good start for bringing consistency to the treatment
of nonprecedential opinions in the federal appellate courts. Unifying
citation practices is a necessary first step. Now that this goal has
been accomplished, the rule could be improved if it were amended to
authorize nonprecedential opinions expressly and establish uniform
procedures for their issuance. More importantly, the status of non-
precedential opinions within the hierarchy of decisional law needs to
be definitively established, either through an amended version of
FRAP 32.1 or by the courts acting in their adjudicative capacity.
A. Authorizing Issuance of and Establishing Uniform
Procedures for Nonprecedential Opinions
An amended version of FRAP 32.1 should expressly authorize the
issuance of nonprecedential opinions. Opponents of nonprecedential
opinions would undoubtedly disagree with that assertion; they would
say that the rule should prohibit the opinions, not authorize them.
But viewing the situation pragmatically, if nonprecedential opinions
are going to remain a fixture of appellate jurisprudence, it would be
better to recognize them nationally, and it would be better for the rule
to do so expressly. Even if this invited constitutional challenge, that
207. The comment regarding FRAP 32.1 mentioned in this Article's introduction cap-
tures this sentiment exactly: "Anyone who states that lawyers and judges have a
common understanding of how to handle unpublished decisions is either mis-
informed or less than candid." Cooper Letter, supra note 16, at 3; cf Sullivan,
supra note 150 (showing that courts assign various degrees of authoritative value
to vacated opinions, even though technically such opinions are legally void).
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would at least get the issue out into the open and invite a resolution
one way or the other.
20 8
In taking this step, a revised version of FRAP 32.1 should addition-
ally establish uniform procedures for issuing nonprecedential opinions
to bring consistency to the range of procedures specified (or not) in
local circuit rules.209 The revised rule should specify whether a pre-
sumption in favor of issuing precedential or nonprecedential opinions
exists, whether specific content in an opinion (e.g., an opinion that
criticizes existing law) affects whether a panel can issue a non-
precedential opinion, whether an opinion must be unanimous for a
panel to issue a nonprecedential opinion, whether the nature of the
disposition (e.g., reversal or affirmance) affects whether an opinion
can be nonprecedential, whether all of the judges on the panel must
agree that the opinion should be precedential or nonprecedential, and
whether and how a nonprecedential opinion can be reissued as prece-
dential.21o The better course of action in my view would be to choose
the most restrictive procedures because nonprecedential opinions
leave me with a queasy feeling.211 The specific procedures ultimately
adopted, however, are not the point of debate. Although there may be
advantages or disadvantages to the various procedural options appli-
cable to issuance of nonprecedential opinions, this is one instance in
which it is more important for the matter to be settled than to be set-
208. NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 34, at 35 (explaining that the Committee re-
jected language authorizing nonprecedential opinions in part to avoid saying that
they are constitutional). This Article proceeds from the premise that non-
precedential opinions are constitutional. If that premise is wrong, then, of
course, nonprecedential opinions should be eliminated, and if affirmatively au-
thorizing them encourages resolution of the constitutional question, that would
be a salutary effect of amending FRAP 32.1. In keeping with a pragmatic view,
however, it seems unlikely that the federal courts will invalidate nonprecedential
opinions on constitutional grounds. Further, although an express authorization
of nonprecedential opinions appears at first glance to make a constitutional chal-
lenge likely, in fact, it would be difficult to find a case with the correct procedural
posture for such a challenge. Sloan, supra note 3, at 713-14 (discussing the bar-
riers to challenging the constitutionality of nonprecedential opinions through
litigation).
209. See supra section III.B.
210. Amendment of FRAP 32.1 to include uniform publication guidelines has been
proposed elsewhere. See, e.g., Diane Adams-Strickland, Comment, Don't Quote
Me: The Law of Judicial Communications in Federal Appellate Practice and the
Constitutionality of Proposed Rule 32.1, 14 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 133, 166-67
(2005). I do not propose specific language here because I do not think it matters
tremendously what the particulars of the standards are so long as they are uni-
form. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
211. See generally Sloan, supra note 3, at 727-33 (discussing the legitimacy problems
that nonprecedential opinions create).
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tled right.2 12 The goal should simply be to provide uniformity of pro-
cedure for issuing the form of precedent that comprises 84% of
dispositions on the merits in the federal appellate courts.
2 13
B. Formalizing the Role of Nonprecedential Opinions in the
Hierarchy of Precedent
A revised version of FRAP 32.1 should also formalize the role of
nonprecedential opinions in our system of precedent. For the rule to
make nonprecedential opinions fully binding and subject to the law of
the circuit rule is not a realistic option. It would make no sense for the
rule to authorize the issuance of nonprecedential opinions but then
make them fully precedential. As noted earlier, the only reason to
have nonprecedential opinions is to give them a different status than
that of precedential opinions; otherwise, all opinions would simply be
precedential and the nonprecedential category would go away.
2 14
More importantly, a rule mandating that all opinions be fully binding
may not be constitutional. 2
15
A more realistic option would be to go back to one of the earlier
proposed versions of FRAP 32.1 providing that nonprecedential opin-
ions may be cited for their persuasive value. This would be better
than the rule's present silence on the matter because nonprecedential
opinions must have some weight. Otherwise, why cite them? By ex-
pressly defining nonprecedential opinions as persuasive authority, an
amended FRAP 32.1 would reduce the uncertainty caused by the vary-
ing expressions of authoritative value that presently appear in the lo-
cal rules.216 But it would do so in a way that would not be a big leap
for the courts because four circuits already say that nonprecedential
opinions are persuasive and eight others provide at least implicitly
that they are not binding.217 At a minimum, this would clear up the
confusion in the District of Columbia Circuit and bring consistency to
the terminology used in all of the circuits.218 Of course, the designa-
212. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("[I]n most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law
be settled than that it be settled right.").
213. TABLE 8-3, supra note 12, at 52 (providing statistics on the number of non-
precedential opinions issued in the federal appellate courts).
214. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
215. See generally Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of
Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 212-14 (2001); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the
Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1594-96 (2000). In
contrast, a rule that simply says courts may not issue opinions that are non-
precedential, without specifying the opinions' precedential weight, would be con-
stitutional. Sloan, supra note 3, at 756-65.
216. See supra notes 186-207 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 177-85 and accompanying text.
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tion of authority as persuasive is not definitive; as noted earlier, the
meaning of persuasive precedent is not entirely clear, and different
nonbinding authorities have different degrees of persuasive value in
different circumstances. 2 19 On the other hand, a uniform national
standard, albeit an imprecise one, would still be an improvement. A
consistent standard at least provides a starting point for developing a
coherent understanding of the role of nonprecedential opinions within
the federal judiciary.
220
But a better approach, and certainly a more provocative one, is for
an amended FRAP 32.1 to specify a value for nonprecedential opinions
that corresponds to their position within the traditional hierarchy of
federal decisional law. A revised FRAP 32.1 should modify the law of
the circuit rule so that nonprecedential opinions are binding unless
overruled by a later panel's precedential opinion. In other words, non-
precedential opinions could be overturned without resort to the en
banc procedure. This would confer on them an "overrulable" status
and place them in between federal district court decisions, which are
not binding at all, and precedential, or published, panel decisions,
which are binding unless overruled en banc. This change should be
prospective only to avoid the problems that converting thousands of
older nonprecedential opinions to overrulable status could create.
Stephen Barnett first raised the possibility of giving overrulable
status to nonprecedential opinions in 2002, although he discussed it in
the context of advocating for courts to amend the law of the circuit
rule acting in their adjudicative capacity. 22 1 As Barnett has ex-
plained, this modification to norms of precedent "would promote, not
subvert, the [law of the circuit] rule's purpose of avoiding intra-circuit
conflicts: As between two conflicting panel decisions, it would be clear
which one governed-the one that was published."222 Unlike propos-
als to make all nonprecedential opinions fully precedential, this propo-
sal gives the appellate courts a workable option for undoing erroneous
nonprecedential opinions because "[planels ... would not have to re-
sort to finespun factual distinctions or aggressive claims of dictum in
order to avoid the force of an unpublished precedent with which they
disagreed. They could simply overrule it, if willing to do so in a pub-
lished opinion."2 23 This avoids a situation in which multiple unpub-
lished decisions conflict with each other, creating confusion about
219. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
220. See Ricks, A Case Study, supra note 14, at 273-76 (outlining reasons why giving
nonprecedential opinions persuasive status would be better than the present sit-
uation in which they have indeterminate status); Ricks, A Modest Proposal,
supra note 173, at 24-29 (advocating persuasive status for nonprecedential opin-
ions as an interim step during a period of adjustment to FRAP 32.1).
221. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart, supra note 61, at 23-24.
222. Id. at 24.
223. Id.
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what the law of the circuit actually is, and forces a panel that wants to
go in a different direction to "put its precedential money where its
mouth is."224
This approach would also be consistent with most circuits' publica-
tion policies. The First,225 Fourth,226 Fifth,227 Sixth,228 Eighth,229
Ninth,230 District of Columbia,2 3 1 and Federal23 2 Circuits all provide
by local rule for publication of opinions that criticize or modify existing
rules of law or create conflicts with previously decided cases. Al-
though the Second,23 3 Third,2 3 4 and Tenth235 Circuits do not specifi-
cally provide for publication under those circumstances, they do
provide for publication when a jurisprudential purpose is served or
when a precedent would be valuable. Publishing to change a non-
precedential ruling would certainly satisfy those rules.
Relying on the current publication policies, however, is not
enough. 23 6 A change to the rule to define the authoritative value of
nonprecedential opinions is necessary for two reasons. First, as noted
above, the publication policies are not specific in all circuits, and the
Seventh2 37 and Eleventh238 Circuits lack any criteria other than gen-
eral policies to avoid publication of too many opinions. Second, if non-
precedential opinions do not count as precedent, then it is not clear
224. Id.
225. 1ST CIR. R. 36.0(b)(1). Because of the presumption in favor of precedential opin-
ions in the First Circuit, the publication criteria are stated in the negative; that
is, an opinion will be published unless it does not modify an established rule,
among other criteria. Id.
226. 4TH CIR. R. 36(a).
227. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.1.
228. 6TH CIR. R. 206(a).
229. 8TH CIR. APP. I(4).
230. 9TH CIR. R. 36-2.
231. D.C. CIR. R. 36(a)(2).
232. FED. CIR. lOP 10(4).
233. 2D CIR. R. 32.1(a) (providing for issuance of a nonprecedential opinion when "no
jurisprudential purpose would be served by an opinion").
234. 3D CIR. IOP 5.2 (providing for issuance of a precedential opinion when the opinion
"has precedential or institutional value").
235. 10TH CIR. R. 36.1 (providing for issuance of a nonprecedential opinion when "the
case does not require application of new points of law that would make the deci-
sion a valuable precedent").
236. This assumes that the federal appellate courts actually can and do follow their
publication criteria, a suggestion that has been challenged. J. Lyn Entrikin Goe-
ring, Legal Fiction of the "Unpublished" Kind: The Surreal Paradox of No-Cita-
tion Rules and the Ethical Duty of Candor, 1 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 27, 73-75
(2005); Dean A. Morande, Comment, Publication Plans in the United States
Courts of Appeals: The Unattainable Paradigm, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 751,
775-79 (2004).
237. 7TH CIR. R. 32.1(a) (stating a policy "to avoid issuing unnecessary opinions").
238. 11TH CIR. R. 36-3 I.O.P. 5 (stating a policy to "reduce the volume of published
opinions").
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that not following them merits publication because that may not con-
stitute a modification of existing law.
If a revised FRAP 32.1 were to give nonprecedential opinions over-
rulable status, federal appellate courts could still follow those opinions
if they wanted to, as they do now. Looking at the treatment of non-
precedential opinions in Shepard's, it is clear that nonprecedential
opinions are followed much more often than they are given negative
treatment. A review of 465 pages of entries in volume 27 of Shepard's,
listing citations to nonprecedential opinions published in volumes 66
through 169 of the Federal Appendix reporter, shows that these opin-
ions were followed 289 times in later federal appellate opinions versus
questioned 3 times in later federal appellate opinions.23 9 Conse-
quently, even if FRAP 32.1 amended the law of the circuit rule, most
federal appellate opinions could continue to be nonprecedential be-
cause they would mostly be followed.
There would, of course, be some uncertainty, as a single panel
could undo a whole series of consistent nonprecedential opinions. But
that uncertainty exists now. No one understands the authoritative
value of nonprecedential opinions under the various local rules, and
precedential opinions can be overruled en banc or by the Supreme
Court. Clearly defining the role of nonprecedential opinions in the hi-
erarchy of authority would strengthen, not undermine, the predict-
ability of the law.
Further, courts could still issue as many nonprecedential opinions
as they wanted to as long as those opinions follow prior decisions
(whether precedential or nonprecedential). The only increase in prec-
edential opinions would be among those panels that overrule prior
nonprecedential opinions. All the amended rule would really do is re-
quire the appellate courts to follow their own nonprecedential opin-
ions when issuing other nonprecedential opinions.
A revised rule would not put any greater burden on the courts than
FRAP 32.1 already does. Now that parties can cite nonprecedential
opinions, judges may feel the need to address them even if they are not
binding.2 40 Moreover, courts already address nonprecedential opin-
ions frequently. As noted earlier, hard bound volumes of Shepard's
include 820 pages of entries cataloguing citations to nonprecedential
opinions.241 An average page lists approximately 21 citations to non-
precedential opinions in later, unrelated cases, which means that non-
precedential opinions were cited more than 17,000 times during the
239. 27 SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS 3-468 (9th ed. LexisNexis 2006).
240. Schiltz, Much Ado about Little, supra note 33, at 1469 n.213 (quoting a comment
on proposed FRAP 32.1 stating that citation of nonprecedential opinions will re-
quire judges to explain, distinguish, or otherwise address those opinions).
241. 26 SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONs 777-1132 (9th ed. LexisNexis 2006); 27 SHEP-
ARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONs 3-468 (9th ed. LexisNexis 2006).
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period covered by these volumes. 242 If these cases are already being
cited by the courts themselves in significant numbers, it is hard to see
how conferring overrulable status adds significantly to the courts'
need to address their prior opinions. Moreover, because the change
would be prospective only, the courts would not have any greater need
to address older nonprecedential opinions than they do now.
Conferring overrulable status on nonprecedential opinions also
should not increase the burden of researching or reading nonpreceden-
tial opinions any more than lifting citation restrictions already has.
Because precedential opinions would continue to carry the greatest
weight, those opinions would continue to be the focus of research and
argument. Nonprecedential opinions would have to conform to the
principles stated in precedential opinions, so the only times non-
precedential opinions would gain prominence is when they either ad-
dress a question of first impression, such that there are no prior
precedential opinions for the court to follow, or when the nonpreceden-
tial opinion is factually analogous to a pending case. But these are
precisely the circumstances under which lawyers and judges are likely
to look to nonprecedential opinions now. People find, read, and cite
these cases when they are helpful; clarifying their position in the hier-
archy of precedent can only be an improvement.
As far as subsidiary tribunals, such as federal district courts, are
concerned, clarifying the weight of nonprecedential opinions would be
insignificant in one respect and significant in another. It would be
insignificant because these tribunals are already following non-
precedential opinions. Again, Shepard's provides useful data. A re-
view of 465 pages of entries in volume 27 of Shepard's, listing citations
to nonprecedential opinions published in volumes 66 through 169 of
the Federal Appendix reporter, shows that these opinions were fol-
lowed 813 times by federal district courts, bankruptcy courts, and
courts of military justice.243 If lower federal tribunals are already
mostly following nonprecedential opinions, conferring overrulable sta-
tus on those opinions is not going to be significant for the results of
their decisions. Making the opinions overrulable will only define with
clarity what authoritative value those opinions carry.
And this clarity is significant. Federal district courts especially are
caught between a rock and a hard place with regard to nonpreceden-
242. Review of a representative sample of pages in volumes 26 and 27 of Shepard's,
listing citations to cases published in the Federal Appendix, showed an average of
21.5 citations per page, not counting decisions in the direct history of the case
(e.g., denials of certiorari, same case citations, connected case citations) or cita-
tions in secondary sources. Multiplying 820 pages by 21.5 citations per page
yields a total of 17,630 citations. Of course, this figure is not exact because I
estimated the average number of citations per page rather than counting each
citation individually.
243. 27 SHEPARD'S FEDERAL CITATIONS 3-468 (9th ed. LexisNexis 2006).
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tial opinions. On the one hand, they are bound to follow the courts
above them, and nonprecedential opinions from appellate courts pro-
vide at least some indication of those courts' views.2 44 On the other
hand, federal district courts have been criticized for relying on non-
precedential opinions, 24 5 even though the appellate courts themselves
follow the opinions with some frequency. 24 6 It would be better for
lower federal tribunals to know the authoritative value of non-
precedential opinions in resolving the cases before them.
Defining the status of nonprecedential opinions as overrulable
would improve the legitimacy of the courts. Because the deciding
panel is not in the best position to assess the future value of its opin-
ion,2 4 7 allowing citation plus overrulability allows well-reasoned opin-
ions to influence later cases and provides a mechanism for taking
those opinions that do not hold up as well under later scrutiny out of
the mix-a sort of common law Darwinism. 248 This is entirely consis-
tent with both the law declaring and error correction functions of in-
termediate appellate courts. 2 49 It also puts the definition of the
weight of authority in the national rules. It looks bad for courts to
define weight of authority through local rules, and it is bad for the
weight to be uncertain at best and inconsistent at worst.
250
244. See, e.g., Coggon v. Barnhart, 354 F. Supp. 2d 40, 51 n.4 (D. Mass. 2005) (noting
that nonprecedential circuit opinions are entitled to "great care and respect"
(quoting Alshrafi v. American Airlines, 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 160 n.9 (D. Mass.
2004))); Giese v. Pierce Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 98, 103 n.1 (D. Mass. 1999)
(indicating that nonprecedential opinions can be persuasive authority).
245. See, e.g., United States v. Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1095 n.21 (9th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the district court but noting "that the district court should not have
relied on an unpublished decision").
246. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (noting the frequency with which fed-
eral appellate courts follow nonprecedential opinions).
247. See Allen, supra note 4, at 597-99 (noting the problems that occur when appellate
courts determine at the time of decision that an opinion is either a lawmaking or
error correcting opinion, an artificial distinction created by the use of non-
precedential opinions). See generally Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree:
Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C.
L. REV. 705, 726-32 (2006) (suggesting that the principle that judges can deter-
mine the future impact of their decisions is a "legal fiction").
248. See Allen, supra note 4, at 604-10 (arguing that bifurcating opinions between
precedential and nonprecedential puts too much weight on precedential opinions
as irrevocable speech acts with consequences that are difficult to undo); Pearson,
supra note 66, at 1258-60 (discussing the respective roles of the panel issuing a
decision and a subsequent panel applying a decision in developing precedent).
249. See Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other Concepts: A Short Course in
Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT. L. REv. 45, 51-52 (2005).
250. The desire for consistency is what led the Framers of the Constitution to believe
that courts should be bound by precedent in the first instance. THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 502-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000) ("To avoid
an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be
bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out
their duty in every particular case that comes before them . . ").
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One could reasonably argue that changing FRAP 32.1 in this way
would effectively eliminate nonprecedential opinions because it as-
signs a precedential value to the opinions, thereby fulfilling the fears
of the rule's opponents. This is only partially true. Making non-
precedential opinions overrulable does give them precedential status
as far as subsidiary tribunals are concerned. It is not, however, the
same as prohibiting nonprecedential opinions outright and making all
opinions fully precedential; rather, it involves defining the role of a
new layer of precedent. The proposal does keep nonprecedential opin-
ions from being valueless non-authority, but eliminating citation re-
strictions has already had the same effect. Again, all this proposal
does is define with clarity what role these opinions play in the hierar-
chy of federal decisional law.
Moreover, it is not nearly as significant a change as simply pro-
nouncing that courts may not issue nonprecedential opinions. Under
the law of the circuit rule as it presently exists, courts must convene
en banc to overrule a prior panel decision. Thus, to outright prohibit
nonprecedential opinions and then require courts to resort to the en
banc procedure to overrule panel decisions would create a significant
burden on the courts. 25 1 Giving nonprecedential opinions a subsidi-
ary status, rather than the "hyperprecedential" status that fully prec-
edential opinions have,2 5 2 would not significantly burden the courts,
especially if the change applied only to nonprecedential decisions is-
sued after a specific date. All appeals have to be heard by panels; al-
tering the rule to create a procedure by which one panel can overrule
another panel therefore does not require a separate procedure or the
involvement of additional judges.2 53 It does require the later panel to
issue a precedential opinion, which arguably creates an additional,
but not unreasonable, amount of work. Indeed, the length and com-
plexity of nonprecedential opinions vary widely,2 54 so in any individ-
ual case, requiring the opinion to be precedential instead of
nonprecedential might not entail any additional work at all. Viewing
the issue pragmatically, defining the status of nonprecedential opin-
ions this way would not create the problems that advocates of their
use fear would occur if all opinions had to be fully precedential, espe-
251. Hearing, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski); Schiltz, Much Ado
About Little, supra note 33, at 1483-84.
252. William M. Richman, Much Ado About the Tip of an Iceberg, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1723, 1726 (2005).
253. Indeed, the majority of the circuits have already modified their procedures for
overruling prior panel opinions. See supra note 151.
254. NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 34, at 36 ("[O]pinions designated as 'non-prece-
dential' . .. [range] from one-paragraph, per-curiam orders to 20-page, signed
opinions containing exhaustive legal analysis.").
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cially in light of the knowledge that courts follow nonprecedential
opinions much more often than they disagree with or criticize them. 255
One objection to this approach is that the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure are not an appropriate vehicle for defining the weight
of precedent. Perhaps it would be better to leave the determination of
something as integral to the judicial process as the weight of prece-
dent to the courts themselves, acting in their judicial capacity. After
all, if the courts, acting in their adjudicatory capacity, are the source
of the law of the circuit rule, they may be best suited to use adjudica-
tion to make any changes to that rule.
This is a good argument. It would be better for the courts to make
this change on their own. Indeed, precedent exists for courts to make
rulings in their adjudicative capacity regarding weight of authority.
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the deci-
sions of the Fifth Circuit, from which the Eleventh Circuit was carved,
as binding precedent. 25 6 The court stated that a judicial decision,
rather than a procedural rule, was the appropriate manner in which
to implement such a decision. 2 57 Although statutes and procedural
rules directed toward the en banc procedure recognize the law of the
circuit rule, no statute or rule establishes the law of the circuit rule or
mandates its application. The Supreme Court recognized the courts'
authority to convene en banc in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Com-
missioner,258 and the federal appellate courts have seen fit to modify
the law of the circuit rule from time to time.2 59 Thus, alteration of the
parameters of the rule is entirely within the courts' judicial power act-
ing in an adjudicative capacity.
However, the problem is that the courts, by and large, have not
followed Bonner's approach. Instead, they purport to define the
weight of nonprecedential opinions in their local rules. 260 Thus, re-
sort to a national procedural rule is consistent with the approach the
courts themselves have chosen to take. If they were to address,
through adjudication, the role of nonprecedential opinions in the hier-
archy of precedent, then perhaps an amended version of FRAP 32.1
would be altogether unnecessary. Further, the idea that determining
the weight of precedent is integral to the judicial process supports ac-
255. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
256. 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
257. Id. at 1211; see also Hearing, supra note 7, at 6, 9 (statement of Judge Alito)
(noting that the courts have traditionally established and developed principles of
stare decisis through adjudication as part of the common law).
258. 314 U.S. 326, 333 (1941).
259. See supra note 151 and authorities cited therein. It has been argued that the law
of the circuit rule is not constitutionally required. Salem M. Katsh & Alex V.
Chachkes, Constitutionality of "No-Citation" Rules, 3 J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS
287, 288 n.5 (2001). Thus, the rule could possibly be eliminated altogether.
260. See supra notes 158-80 and accompanying text.
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tion on a national level. Something that important should not be left
to inconsistent local rules and internal operating procedures.261 By
leaving the matter to local procedural rules, the courts open them-
selves up to regulation in kind on the national level. Finally, a rule-
based approach is the best way to give the change prospective effect
only. Changing the rule to become effective only as of a specific date,
the way FRAP 32.1 did with citation of nonprecedential opinions,
avoids the problems that judges fear will occur if all previously issued
nonprecedential opinions suddenly become precedential. 2 62
Yet another possible objection is that using an amended version of
FRAP 32.1 to define the authoritative value of nonprecedential opin-
ions goes beyond the rulemaking authority delegated by Congress.
Viewing this issue pragmatically, however, the courts have boxed
themselves into a corner. Because the courts have used local rules to
define the weight of nonprecedential opinions, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, for them to invalidate an amended FRAP 32.1 that
modifies the law of the circuit rule without simultaneously invalidat-
ing their own local rules.
The Rules Enabling Act, through which the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure are promulgated, authorizes the Supreme Court to
make "general rules of practice and procedure" that are consistent
with federal statutes. 26 3 These rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right."2 64 Thus, the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure must be general rules of practice and procedure and
cannot abridge, enlarge, or modify substantive rights.
Patrick Schiltz, the Reporter for the Appellate Rules Committee
during the time when FRAP 32.1 was under consideration, has said
that a "rule that prescribed the legal force that must be accorded un-
published opinions would likely 'abridge, enlarge or modify' the 'sub-
stantive right[s]' of the parties" and, therefore, would exceed the
261. Cf. Pearson, supra note 66, at 1299 ("If the constraining effect of precedent is
fundamentally important to our legal system, judges cannot be freed from it on
grounds of efficiency.").
262. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33, at 1483-84 (describing judicial
concerns about uses of nonprecedential opinions). As Schiltz explains:
Several judges who oppose Rule 32.1 have told me privately that what
really concerns them is not that unpublished opinions will be cited, but
that courts will eventually be forced to treat unpublished opinions as
precedential. The courts of appeals have issued hundreds of thousands
of unpublished opinions, and judges have no idea what is in
them .... Judges are terrified that they will wake up one day and find
themselves bound by this mountain of unpublished opinions.
Id. at 1483. Requiring courts to use the en banc procedure to correct every mis-
take in nonprecedential opinions issued over the years would create decades of
work. Id. at 1484.
263. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2072(a) (2000).
264. Id. § 2072(b).
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rulemaking authority delegated to the courts. 26 5 Bradley Scott Shan-
non agrees and adds that such a rule also would not be procedural in
nature because it would not primarily be directed toward acts neces-
sary to enforce rights and duties, or in other words, conduct necessary
to resolve a case.
26 6
They may be right, but accepting either objection carries conse-
quences for the entire house of cards created by local rules regarding
nonprecedential opinions. With respect to Schiltz's concern about the
scope of rulemaking authority, he provides no explanation for his con-
clusion that a rule prescribing the authoritative value of nonpreceden-
tial opinions exceeds the statutory delegation. Even if his conclusion
is correct with respect to a rule making all nonprecedential opinions
fully binding, it may not be true of one that simply provides a proce-
dure for not following nonprecedential opinions (i.e., issuing a prece-
dential opinion). Moreover, it is interesting to note that this concern
was not one of the reasons why the Appellate Rules Committee re-
jected proposed versions of FRAP 32.1 that contained language al-
lowing citation of nonprecedential opinions for persuasive value.
26 7
265. Schiltz, Much Ado About Little, supra note 33, at 1429, 1484 n.273 (alteration in
original).
266. See Shannon, supra note 18, at 666. Shannon discusses the nonprocedural na-
ture of rules defining weight of authority in the context of rules abrogating stare
decisis, but his analysis applies equally to a rule altering principles of stare
decisis.
267. The Appellate Rules Committee discussed the original Department of Justice
proposal for a rule to eliminate citation restrictions at its April 2002 meeting,
with a majority concluding that a national rule addressing citation practices was
appropriate. APRIL MEETING, supra note 17, at 23-27. The minutes of the Appel-
late Rules Committee's November 2002 meeting contain the three original ver-
sions of FRAP 32.1, including the ones that limited the weight of nonprecedential
opinions to their "persuasive value;" these proposals were discussed at length,
but no mention was made of whether the proposals in general or the "persuasive
value" language in particular were beyond the rulemaking authority conferred by
the Rules Enabling Act. NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 34, at 34-39. In May
2003, the proposal later approved for public comment (Alternative B), which did
not contain the "persuasive value" language, was presented to the committee,
thus obviating the need for any discussion of whether that language presented a
problem under the Rules Enabling Act. ADVISORY COMM. ON APPELLATE RULES,
MINUTES OF THE SPRING 2003 MEETING 11 (May 15, 2003), http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Minutes/app0503.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2007). Concerns about the
rule as sent out for comment did arise in comments objecting to the proposal. See
Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra note 16, at 43 (summarizing a
comment arguing that FRAP 32.1 "is not a 'general rule[ ] of practice and proce-
dure' because, if the rule is adopted, 'some judges will make the opinion more
elaborate in order to make clear the context of the ruling, while other judges will
shorten the opinion in order to provide less citable material,'" and, by affecting
"'the construction and import of opinions,'" the rule would go beyond the
rulemaking authority conferred by the Rules Enabling Act (quoting Letter from
John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, to
Peter G. McCabe, Sec'y, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 5 (Feb. 11,
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Because local rules cannot conflict with national rules, specifying that
nonprecedential opinions may be cited for persuasive value could have
prohibited a circuit from giving precedential weight to nonpreceden-
tial opinions.268 This is a limitation on the authoritative value of non-
precedential opinions that no one seemed to find problematic from the
standpoint of rulemaking authority.
If a version of FRAP 32.1 that gives nonprecedential opinions bind-
ing weight in limited situations would exceed the scope of rulemaking
authority, then the local rules purporting to define the weight of non-
precedential opinions are similarly invalid. 2 69 Local rules are subject
to the same strictures that national rules are, with the additional ca-
veat that local rules cannot contravene the national rules.2 70 Thus, if
a version of FRAP 32.1 that defined nonprecedential opinions as bind-
ing in limited contexts and subject to overruling by later panels would
exceed the rulemaking power delegated by Congress, then the entire
local rules system defining the weight of nonprecedential opinions is
similarly invalid. Approaching the problem pragmatically, either the
rule would stand as a valid exercise of rulemaking authority, which
would improve the situation with nonprecedential opinions, or the
rule would fall, bringing the local rules down along with it, thereby
eliminating the very local rules that are the source of the problem.
This same situation insulates a revised version of FRAP 32.1 from
a constitutional challenge. An amended version of FRAP 32.1 could be
challenged on separation of powers grounds. Because the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure are creatures of delegated statutory au-
thority, they cannot validly accomplish anything that Congress could
not do by statute.27 1 Indeed, if the courts were unwilling to amend
FRAP 32.1 on their own, Congress could change the rule statuto-
2004), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf-files/Comments/03-AP-329.
pdf)). These arguments apparently were not convincing to the Appellate Rules
Committee, the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the Supreme
Court, or Congress.
268. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (discussing the interplay between
local and national rules).
269. See generally Shannon, supra note 18 (arguing that local rules defining the au-
thoritative value of nonprecedential opinions are invalid).
270. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2000); FED. R. App. P. 47.
271. Through the Rules Enabling Act, Congress delegates its legislative authority to
the courts. Sloan, supra note 3, at 734-35. The courts propose procedural rules,
and the proposed rules are submitted to Congress. Id. at 735. If Congress does
nothing, the rules go into effect as submitted. Id. at 735-36. To reject or change
a rule, Congress must act legislatively. Id. at 735 n.108. For a more detailed
description of the rulemaking process, see supra note 31. Because the ultimate
control over procedural rulemaking in the federal courts rests with Congress, the
rules cannot be used to accomplish tasks that Congress could not directly legis-
late. Sloan, supra note 3, at 733-45.
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rily.2 72 The local rules are subject to the same restrictions. They are
authorized by the Rules Enabling Act and by FRAP 47. Thus, they are
as much creatures of delegated statutory authority as are the national
rules. If an amended version of FRAP 32.1 is unconstitutional be-
cause Congress cannot legislate in a way that affects the weight courts
give to their own opinions, then the local rules scheme that uses the
statutory mechanism to do just that must also fail on constitutional
grounds.
The one potential difficulty with this position is that local rules
operate in a pocket of air created by the courts' inherent rulemaking
power. While Congress has legislative authority to regulate procedure
in the courts, the courts also have inherent judicial authority to regu-
late procedure. 27 3 To a large degree, these sources of power overlap,
but, at the outer limits, there are some aspects of procedure that can
only be defined legislatively (such as jurisdiction) and others that can
only be defined judicially (such as the length of a judicial opinion).2 74
National rules are subject to direct congressional control and, there-
fore, must be limited to aspects of procedure that Congress could ac-
complish by statute.2 75 Local rules, by contrast, are not subject to
direct congressional control. Although their scope is limited-they
must regulate procedure and cannot alter substantive rights or con-
flict with federal statutes or procedural rules-they are subject to re-
view only by the judicial council of the circuit, not by Congress.2 76
Accordingly, it is possible that some local rules derive from Article III
judicial power, not delegated statutory authority, and therefore could
be directed toward a matter that the national rules could not regulate.
It has been argued that any inherent judicial rulemaking power
that exists is the power to regulate procedure in individual cases
through the adjudicative process, not the power to promulgate gener-
ally applicable rules in statutory form like the local rules regarding
272. For example, in the USA Patriot Act, Congress amended Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure 6 and 41. Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 203(a)(1), 219, 115 Stat. 272,
278-80, 291 (2001) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. (Supp. IV 2004)). The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 included amendments to
FRAP 22(a) concerning writs of habeas corpus. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 103, 110
Stat. 1214, 1218 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. (2000)).
273. E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991) (holding that the district
court "properly invoked its inherent power in assessing as a sanction for a party's
bad-faith conduct attorney's fees and related expenses"); see also Shannon, supra
note 18, at 672-74 (discussing areas in which courts have rulemaking authority);
Sloan, supra note 3, at 737 (discussing areas in which courts have rulemaking
authority).
274. Sloan, supra note 3, at 737-40.
275. Id. at 743-44.
276. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (2000).
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nonprecedential opinions. 2 77 If that is right, then local circuit rules,
although not directly controlled by Congress, are still derived from
delegated legislative authority and are subject to the same limitations
to which national rules are subject because they are promulgated pur-
suant to the Rules Enabling Act. This makes sense. It would be
anomalous for the local rules to be subordinate to federal statutes and
national rules, as 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) and FRAP 47 provide, but then
still somehow independent such that they could regulate matters be-
yond legislative and national rulemaking power. Further, to the ex-
tent that local rules can be changed or invalidated altogether by
national rules (FRAP 32.1's elimination of citation restrictions is a
case in point), then they are, albeit indirectly, subject to congressional
control. It would be hard to think of a matter beyond Congress's reach
over which courts have inherent rulemaking authority that the courts
could or would address in their local rules.
And yet, if there is such a matter, it is the authoritative value of
precedent. Although it seems unlikely that local circuit rules are de-
rived from a different source of constitutional power than are national
rules, I will assume for the sake of argument that they are. If that is
the case, then an amended version of FRAP 32.1 derives from a differ-
ent source of authority, delegated legislative authority, and thus
raises separation of powers concerns that need to be addressed. Con-
gress cannot constitutionally tell the courts that they must give full
precedential value to all of their own prior opinions.2 78 Whether
amending FRAP 32.1 to alter the law of the circuit rule (either by the
courts through the Rules Enabling Act process or by Congress statuto-
rily) is constitutional is a close question. The answer might depend on
the analytical framework used to resolve the constitutional question.
It is possible, however, to characterize this proposal as a procedure
courts must use to categorize opinions as either precedential or non-
precedential rather than as a rule defining weight of authority, thus
making it constitutional.
To determine whether one branch has stepped on another branch's
constitutional toes, the Supreme Court employs two different analyti-
277. Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking "Substantive Rights" (in the Rules Enabling Act) More
Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 66-67 (1998) (noting that the Supreme
Court has recognized inherent rulemaking authority only in the context of case-
by-case adjudication); Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Consti-
tutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 725 (1995) (arguing
that promulgating freestanding rules of general applicability does not fit with the
exercise of inherent judicial power, whose hallmark is the adjudication of individ-
ual disputes); Shannon, supra note 18, at 680-81 (arguing that courts lack inher-
ent authority to promulgate statute-like procedural rules). For examples, see
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43-44, and Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 438
nn.1-2 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
278. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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cal models, the functionalist approach and the formalist approach. 2 79
The functionalist approach begins with the premise that it is impossi-
ble to completely segregate government powers within the individual
branches. 28 0 Thus, functionalist analysis requires an evaluation of
the effect of legislative action on the relative balance of power among
the branches of government; it seeks to ensure that no one branch be-
comes too powerful relative to the others even if, at the margins, one
branch performs some tasks that belong to one of the other
branches. 28 1 As long as one branch does not usurp all of another
branch's power, some power sharing is permissible. 28 2 In contrast to
the functionalist balancing approach, the formalist approach is a cate-
gorical approach that evaluates whether the action of one branch
usurps any function that the Constitution vests in another branch.
28 3
The categorization of a function as executive, legislative, or judicial
determines which branch of government can perform it.2 84 Under a
formalist approach, therefore, Congress is prohibited from enacting
legislation that gives to itself or delegates to the executive any func-
tion that Article III commits to the federal courts as part of the judi-
cial power. 28 5 A version of FRAP 32.1 designating nonprecedential
opinions as binding unless overruled by a subsequent precedential
panel decision passes constitutional muster under a functionalist ap-
proach; its validity using formalist analysis, however, is less certain.
279. The functionalist and formalist methods of analysis have been described in many
previous articles; the description here is not unique. See Sloan, supra note 3, at
746-53 (describing and applying functionalist and formalist analysis); see also
Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act
and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1290-92 (1993); Redish, supra
note 277, at 709-12; Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Fed-
eral) Courts, 2000 Sup. CT. REV. 357, 362-63.
280. Sloan, supra note 3, at 748.
281. Id. at 762. As James Madison explained, the Constitution permits the three
branches of government to have "partial agency in," or "control over, the acts of
each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 309 (Robert Scigliano ed., 2000); see also
Redish, supra note 277, at 711-12 (describing the indeterminate nature of func-
tionalist balancing); Mullenix, supra note 279, at 1293-94 (explaining the balanc-
ing required in functionalist analysis).
282. Madison saw separation of powers problems only "where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of
another department." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 281, at 309; see also
Vermeule, supra note 279, at 363 (describing the limits of power sharing).
283. Sloan, supra note 3, at 748.
284. Redish, supra note 277, at 709-10; Vermeule, supra note 279, at 363.
285. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) ("[T]he Constitution prohibits one
branch from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another." (citations omit-
ted)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121-22 (1976) (explaining that Congress is
prohibited from transferring its legislative power to another branch or from tak-
ing on another branch's power for itself) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
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The functionalist approach would assess whether amending the
law of the circuit rule through FRAP 32.1 unduly interferes with the
federal appellate courts' ability to perform their core function of decid-
ing cases and whether it risks accumulating too much power in the
legislative branch. 286 An analysis of the scope of an amended FRAP
32.1, the degree to which it leaves traditional judicial functions with
the courts, and the concerns that would motivate Congress to amend
FRAP 32.1 suggests that such a rule would not diminish the judicial
power. In addition, the amended rule would not aggrandize legisla-
tive power. Because an amended FRAP 32.1 would not upset the bal-
ance of power between Congress and the federal courts, it would be
constitutional under a functionalist analysis.
28 7
The scope of a statute is one of the factors the Supreme Court has
used to evaluate the legislation's effect on judicial power.28 8 An
amended version of FRAP 32.1 would undoubtedly have a broad scope
because it would affect all nonprecedential opinions, roughly 84% of
opinions issued by the federal appellate courts. 28 9 Compare this with
the statute upheld in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor.290 In that case, the Court used a functionalist approach to up-
hold a statute allowing the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC) to hear certain state law counterclaims arising out of claims
under the Commodity Exchange Act.291 One reason the Court gave
286. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text; see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 383-84 (1989) (rejecting the argument that congressional
delegation of authority to promulgate sentencing guidelines improperly usurped
judicial power); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
851-52 (1986) (discussing whether congressional delegation of authority to the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) was a violation of separation of
powers). Although the sentencing guidelines upheld in Mistretta were later ren-
dered advisory, rather than mandatory, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,
226-27 (2005), the Booker court relied on Sixth Amendment grounds, not separa-
tion of powers concerns. Id. Thus, Mistretta remains a useful precedent for ana-
lyzing separation of powers claims.
287. A similar functionalist analysis of separation of powers concerns arising out of
legislative action affecting judicial power appears in an earlier article. Sloan,
supra note 3, at 762-65 (analyzing Congressional power to prohibit nonpreceden-
tial opinions by statute). Because federal procedural rules are promulgated pur-
suant to delegated legislative authority, analogous reasoning applies to an
evaluation the constitutionality of a revised version of FRAP 32.1.
288. Id. at 762; see, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 852 (explaining that the limited jurisdic-
tion of the CFTC provided one justification for upholding a statute that trans-
ferred jurisdiction for some claims from the courts to the agency).
289. TABLE S-3, supra note 12; cf. Sloan, supra note 3, at 762 (analyzing the scope of a
statute prohibiting nonprecedential opinions in terms of the number of non-
precedential opinions issued).
290. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-53.
291. Id. at 836-41. As the Court explained, in resolving the case, it "declined to adopt
formalistic and unbending rules," choosing instead to "weigh[ ] a number of fac-
tors, . . . with an eye to the practical effect that the congressional action will have
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for upholding the statute was that, even though it took some cases
away from the courts and gave them to an agency for adjudication, it
affected a small number of cases. 29 2 Amending FRAP 32.1 to define
nonprecedential opinions as overrulable would affect many more
cases.
There is, however, another way to view the statute. The statute at
issue in Schor removed some claims from consideration by Article III
courts. A revised FRAP 32.1 would not do so; thus it could be seen as
having a narrower scope than the statute upheld in Schor.293 Fur-
ther, a broad scope does not necessarily render a statute unconstitu-
tional under a functionalist analysis, as Mistretta v. United States
29 4
shows. In Mistretta, the Court again used functionalist analysis to
evaluate the constitutionality of the statute that created the United
States Sentencing Commission (USSC), an independent agency within
the judiciary charged with creating sentencing guidelines for federal
judges to follow. 29 5 Criminal cases constitute a large part of the fed-
eral courts' dockets, and the sentencing guidelines affected all of those
cases. Yet the Court upheld the statute. 29 6 Similarly, the fact that a
rule conferring overrulable status on nonprecedential opinions would
affect a large number of cases is not, by itself, dispositive in a function-
alist analysis. 29 7
The "extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are
reserved to Article III courts"298 is a second factor to consider. 29 9
Amending the law of the circuit rule to give a defined weight to non-
precedential opinions would not interfere with the courts' core func-
tion of deciding cases, thus leaving the essential attributes of judicial
power with the federal courts. The rule would not dictate the results
in individual cases because courts could avoid following prior non-
on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary." Id. at 851. Thus,
its approach is fairly characterized as functionalist.
292. Id. at 852. As the Court noted, the CFTC "deals only with a 'particularized area
of law.'" Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
85 (1982)).
293. Cf Sloan, supra note 3, at 762 (comparing the effect of a statute prohibiting non-
precedential opinions with the effect of the statute at issue in Schor).
294. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
295. Id. at 367-68. Mistretta can be characterized as employing functionalist reason-
ing because the court recognized criminal sentencing as a matter subject to
shared control among the branches of government, id. at 390, and because it eval-
uated the effect of the statutory scheme on the balance of power between the
legislative and judicial branches, id. at 393-97.
296. Id. at 412.
297. Cf Sloan, supra note 3, at 762 (comparing the scope of a statute prohibiting non-
precedential opinions with the scope of the sentencing guidelines).
298. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81).
299. Sloan, supra note 3, at 762.
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precedential opinions simply by issuing precedential opinions when
they disagreed with a prior opinion.
Using FRAP 32.1 to amend the law of the circuit rule would affect
the judiciary in a manner similar to the sentencing guidelines upheld
in Mistretta, in which the discretion to determine criminal sentences
was taken from individual judges and given to the USSC.300 Simi-
larly, a rule defining nonprecedential opinions as overrulable would
take the discretion to determine whether a particular opinion is bind-
ing or non-binding away from the panel deciding the case and give it
to the panel applying the case. The applying panel would then have
the power to determine first whether the prior opinion applies to the
present case and then, if it did, to disregard the prior case by issuing a
precedential opinion. Thus, rather than diminishing judicial power,
an amended FRAP 32.1 would merely shift the discretion to determine
the authoritative value of an opinion from one judicial actor to
another.3 0
Amending the law of the circuit rule through a revised FRAP 32.1
could be seen as interfering with traditional judicial functions by in-
terfering with docket management.3 0 2 This argument posits that giv-
ing precedential value to nonprecedential opinions would keep judges
from resolving pending cases in a timely fashion because they would
have to devote too much time to writing opinions in routine cases.
3 0 3
This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. For one, it is usu-
ally raised in the context of proposals to make nonprecedential opin-
ions fully binding; it is not clear that this argument in any way applies
to a proposal to make them overrulable. For another, to the extent
that this is a valid concern, it is not clear that making nonprecedential
opinions overrulable creates any greater problem for docket manage-
ment than removing the citation restrictions already has. Further, as
noted above, any arguable increase in work that the proposal might
create is likely to be small. Finally, the rule would not mandate com-
300. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (noting that the USSC, which divested judges of some
sentencing discretion, is located in the judicial branch).
301. Cf Sloan, supra note 3, at 763 (comparing the effect of a statute prohibiting non-
precedential opinions on judicial power with the effect of the sentencing guide-
lines and arguing that shifts in discretion among judicial actors does not diminish
judicial power).
302. Id. at 763.
303. As Judge Alito has explained,
It would be virtually impossible for the courts of appeals to keep current
with their case loads if they attempted to produce [a precedential] opin-
ion in every case. Responsible appellate judges must devote more time
to an opinion that changes the law or clarifies it in an important way
(and may thus affect many litigants in future cases) than to an opinion
that simply applies well-established law to specific facts (and thus af-
fects solely the litigants at hand).
Hearing, supra note 7, at 8.
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prehensive opinions in every case. It would not require written opin-
ions at all. The federal appellate courts would be free to dispose of
cases orally, with one-line dispositions, with short opinions, or in any
other manner they see fit. Because the rule would dictate neither the
form nor the content of judicial opinions, it would leave with the
courts the traditional attributes of judicial power.
30 4
The concern motivating legislative action is the third factor the Su-
preme Court has used to determine whether Congress has impermis-
sibly intruded on the judicial branch's power. 30 5 The concerns over
the problems arising from having a layer of precedent with indetermi-
nate status are at least as significant as those motivating the legisla-
tion at issue in Mistretta and Schor. Mistretta is, again, a good
analogy. Congress's concerns over inconsistent criminal sentences
motivated creation of the USSC.306 Concerns over inconsistent judi-
cial decisionmaking would similarly justify amending the law of the
circuit rule through a revised version of FRAP 32.1. Although the rule
creates some minimal risk of increasing the number of one-word dis-
positions, that risk may be worth taking,3O7 especially given the ac-
knowledgement by some judges that nonprecedential opinions do not
always reflect the actual reasoning of the courts. 30 8 On the other
hand, the fact that the rule would leave open the option for federal
appellate courts to issue nonprecedential opinions so long as those
opinions follow earlier rulings mitigates that concern. Finally, as
noted above, eliminating citation restrictions, as FRAP 32.1 has al-
ready done, is just as likely to lead to more summary dispositions; es-
tablishing the status of nonprecedential opinions definitively is
probably not going to increase the number of summary dispositions
any more than lifting the citation restrictions already has.
304. Cf Sloan, supra note 3, at 763 (arguing that a statute prohibiting nonpreceden-
tial opinions would not interfere with traditional judicial functions as long as it
did not dictate the form or content of judicial opinions).
305. Id. at 762.
306. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-66 (explaining that Congress's dissatisfaction with
sentencing disparities was one reason for creating the United States Sentencing
Commission).
307. See Schiltz, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, supra note 16, at 73 (arguing that,
to the extent FRAP 32.1 prevents judges from "averting their gaze" from the un-
comfortable problem of nonprecedential opinions, such an improvement over the
prior situation might warrant toleration of some concomitant increase in one-line
orders). But see Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and
an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1649-50 (2005) (arguing
that judges, as trustees of the law, abdicate their judicial role when they issue
decisions without explanation).
308. E.g., Hearing, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of Judge Kozinski) (explaining that
a nonprecedential opinion does not always reflect all of the three panel judges'
actual reasoning); NOVEMBER MEETING, supra note 34, at 36-37 (noting that
judges may join an opinion when they agree with the result, even if they do not
agree with the reasoning, when they know the opinion will be nonprecedential).
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The functionalist approach also requires analyzing the effect of the
proposed rule on legislative power.30 9 Amending the law of the cir-
cuit rule through a revised version of FRAP 32.1 would not upset the
balance of power between the branches because it would not aggran-
dize the legislature at the judiciary's expense. Congress, either by act-
ing on its own or delegating its authority through the Rules Enabling
Act, would not gain any power by changing the law of the circuit rule.
All the rule does is create a procedure for categorizing cases to deter-
mine whether they can be issued as nonprecedential or must be issued
as precedential. Opinions that follow prior nonprecedential opinions
may themselves be issued as nonprecedential opinions. Opinions that
do not follow prior nonprecedential opinions must be issued as prece-
dential opinions. As in Schor, any de minimis intrusion on judicial
power occasioned by amending FRAP 32.1 would not inure to Con-
gress's benefit.31o
An amended version of FRAP 32.1 defining nonprecedential opin-
ions as overrulable precedent would not diminish the judiciary's
power. It would not interfere with core judicial functions. It would
not reallocate judicial power to Congress. It would address valid con-
cerns about arbitrary judicial decisionmaking. Thus, an amended ver-
sion of FRAP 32.1 would be constitutional under the functionalist
approach.
Using formalist analysis, the outcome is less clear. Formalism lim-
its each branch of government to the functions the Constitution as-
signs to it; thus, Congress is prohibited from performing functions
assigned to the judiciary in Article 111.311 A rule that defines non-
precedential opinions as binding unless overruled by a precedential
panel opinion will not survive formalist scrutiny if it usurps the judi-
cial function of defining the weight of nonprecedential opinions.
3 12 If
the proposed rule is viewed as legislative definition of the weight of
authority, it would not pass constitutional muster using formalist
analysis. If it is viewed as a procedural device for categorizing opin-
ions, then it would.
The result would turn on whether the Supreme Court views the
rule as analogous to a retroactive extension of a statute of limitations,
which was invalidated in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,313 or the
imposition of an automatic stay if a court does not rule on a matter
within a defined time period, which was upheld in Miller v. French.3 14
309. Sloan, supra note 3, at 764.
310. Cf. id. (comparing a statute prohibiting nonprecedential opinions with the statute
at issue in Schor).
311. Id. at 765.
312. See supra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
313. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
314. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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Both cases involved statutorily created procedural devices affecting
judicial decisionmaking, yet the Court reached opposite conclusions in
each.
Plaut concerned legislation that retroactively extended the limita-
tions period for selected claims under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, reopening final judgments in some cases dismissed as untimely
before the statute was passed.31 5 The Supreme Court used a formalist
approach to rule the statute unconstitutional on separation of powers
grounds.316 After defining the judicial power as the power to decide
cases finally on the merits, the Plaut majority held that the statute
usurped the judicial function of rendering dispositive judgments .in in-
dividual cases. Thus, the statute violated separation of powers princi-
ples.3 17 The majority explained that, "the doctrine of separation of
powers is a structural safeguard rather than a remedy to be applied
only when specific harm, or risk of specific harm, can be identified."31
8
The majority thus characterized separation of powers doctrine as a
"prophylactic device" used to define unambiguous boundaries between
legislative and judicial power. 319 This overprotective approach to
guard against encroachments on judicial power has been described as
"alarm-clock formalism," an approach "akin to setting an alarm clock
one hour ahead of the time at which the sleeper must rise; even if the
sleeper sleeps for an hour after the alarm goes off, he will awaken at
the right time."320
Using Plaut formalism, amending the law of the circuit rule
through a revised version of FRAP 32.1 would almost certainly be un-
constitutional. The rule would necessarily define nonprecedential
opinions as binding authority in some contexts (for example, for fed-
eral district courts within a circuit). Defining the weight of authority
is a quintessential judicial function integral to the process of deciding
cases. If Congress could tell courts what weight to give to individual
authorities, it could effectively direct the outcome of cases, thereby
usurping the judicial function.
315. 514 U.S. at 213-15, 225-28.
316. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 225-28. The concurring and dissenting opinions, by contrast,
used functionalist analysis. Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, reasoned that,
although a statute reopening final judgments did not always risk giving too much
power to Congress, the statute at issue in Plaut did. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 241-44
(Breyer, J., concurring). The dissenters' functionalist balancing led to the oppo-
site result. They argued that retroactively reopening the judgments affected by
the longer statute of limitations "merely remove [d] an impediment to judicial de-
cision on the merits," and therefore, did not violate separation of powers princi-
ples. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 260-61. See Sloan, supra note 3, at 749, for a more
detailed discussion of the concurring and dissenting opinions.
317. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 219.
318. Id. at 239.
319. Id.
320. Vermeule, supra note 279, at 365-66.
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In the second case, Miller v. French,3 2 1 the Supreme Court upheld
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which imposed
new substantive standards for the grant of an injunction in cases chal-
lenging prison conditions, 32 2 using formalist analysis.3 2 3 At issue was
a provision of the PLRA that automatically stays injunctions issued by
district courts in prison litigation unless the court makes specific find-
ings required by the Act within a prescribed period of time.3 24 Once
the district court makes the necessary findings, the stay is lifted,325
and the injunction is dissolved, modified, or continued, as appropriate.
In analyzing the separation of powers arguments, the Miller ma-
jority employed a fairly narrow definition of judicial power, saying
that it is the power "to render dispositive judgments .... "326 The
majority then focused on the temporary nature of the stay, noting that
it suspends an existing injunction only when the district court fails to
rule within the statutory time limit and that the injunction goes back
in force when and if the district court makes the factual findings re-
quired for its continuation.3 27 Thus, the imposition of the automatic
stay does not usurp the judicial function of rendering dispositive judg-
ments; it "does not by itself 'tell judges when, how, or what to do."'328
Having determined that the automatic stay provision did not pre-
sent a separation of powers problem, the majority next considered the
time limit triggering the automatic stay. Courts have generally re-
sisted statutorily imposed time limits for judicial decisionmaking,
3 2 9
321. 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
322. Id. at 331-32, 348-50.
323. This is a bit unusual. When reviewing legislation for violations of separation of
powers, Supreme Court reliance on formalist reasoning generally signals that the
legislation will be struck down, whereas reliance on functionalism signals that
the legislation will be upheld. E.g., Mullenix, supra note 279, at 1292 n.31.
324. Miller, 530 U.S. at 333-34.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 342-44 ("[Blecause Article III 'gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them, subject to review only by superior
courts in the Article III hierarchy,' the 'judicial Power is one to render dispositive
judgments ... ." (citations omitted)); Sloan, supra note 3, at 753 (citing Miller and
characterizing the majority's definition of judicial power as narrow).
327. Miller, 530 U.S. at 346-49.
328. Id. at 346-48 (quoting the lower court's opinion in French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d
437, 449 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing
en banc)).
329. When faced with statutory time limits for making decisions, federal courts typi-
cally have not invalidated the statutes, but, rather, have found creative ways to
avoid direct conflicts between legislative and judicial power. For example, courts
have ruled that they have the equitable power to adjust a statutory time limit,
both when the statute itself does and does not provide such an exception. Hadix
v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925, 946 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's automatic stay provision by ruling that the court had the equitable
power to stay the stay, even though the statute did not provide such an excep-
tion); United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 695-99 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding
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and one of the main arguments in Miller was that the deadline trig-
gering the automatic stay interfered with core judicial functions.
3 30
The majority disagreed, noting that the PLRA "does not deprive courts
of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard
for relief and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly."
3 3 1
Viewed one way, an amended version of FRAP 32.1 runs the risk of
telling courts how or what to do. It would arguably tell courts what
results to reach by requiring them to follow nonprecedential opinions
in limited contexts. And it would arguably tell courts how to issue
opinions by requiring them to publish precedential opinions to over-
come the limited precedential effect of overrulable (nonprecedential)
opinions.
Viewed differently, however, an amended version of FRAP 32.1 is
similar to the automatic stay provision in that, although it has an ef-
fect on the decisionmaking process, it does not deprive the courts of
their adjudicatory role. If nonprecedential opinions gained overrul-
able status, district courts and other subsidiary tribunals would have
to follow them, but these lower court decisions would be subject to ap-
peal as of right. Federal appellate panels would not be bound to follow
a prior nonprecedential opinion. If they wanted to overrule a prior
nonprecedential opinion, all they would have to do is follow the proce-
dure set out in the proposed rule-issue a precedential opinion-just
as a district court could avoid imposition of an automatic stay under
the PLRA by ruling on a prison litigation injunction within the statu-
tory time limit. If the Miller v. French analogy holds sway, the
amended version of FRAP 32.1 arguably does survive constitutional
scrutiny, even using formalist analysis.3 32
time limits in the Speedy Trial Act because the Act's general authorization for a
court to extend the time for good cause kept it from infringing on the courts' judi-
cial power). Time limits have also been characterized as "hortatory or advisory
rather than mandatory." In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1997)
(ruling that a time limit in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
that applied to successive habeas corpus petitions did not infringe on judicial
authority).
330. Miller, 530 U.S. at 349-50.
331. Id. at 350.
332. Both Plaut and Miller seem wrongly decided. Retroactively extending the statute
of limitations to reopen previously dismissed claims does not interfere with the
courts' adjudicatory function but rather simply "removes an impediment to judi-
cial decision on the merits." Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 260
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the statute at issue in Plaut, the courts
were free to allow the claims to continue or to dismiss them on the merits. It is
hard to understand why the majority thought that the statute interfered with the
courts' ability to resolve individual cases on the merits because if anything, the
statute allowed the courts to consider the merits of cases that otherwise would
have been dismissed for being untimely. See id. at 260-61. Miller's automatic
stay provision seems much more intrusive because it effectively determines the
merits of the claim for the court, albeit temporarily. The intrusiveness of this
[Vol. 86:895950
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It would be advisable as a matter of policy, permissible under the
Rules Enabling Act, and constitutional for an amended version of
FRAP 32.1 to authorize nonprecedential opinions expressly and to
modify the law of the circuit rule to give those opinions overrulable
status. Is it likely to happen? No. Given the vehemence of the views
on both sides on citation norms alone, the battle over making these
types of changes to FRAP 32.1 would be insurmountable. This is espe-
cially true because the rulemaking process is generally a consensus-
based process. Even if supporters of such a change outnumbered op-
ponents, the rulemaking process is not a likely vehicle for resolving a
matter about which members of the judiciary disagree. Although such
an amendment is unlikely to make it through the rulemaking process,
initiating the proposal could be worthwhile; it could jump-start the
conversation within the judiciary regarding uniform definition of the
weight of nonprecedential opinions and could potentially spur serious
consideration of creation of the overrulable category of precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
Nonprecedential opinions are here to stay in the federal appellate
courts for the foreseeable future. At this point, they will be discontin-
ued only if their issuance is determined to be unconstitutional (an un-
likely prospect), if they are eliminated by federal statute or procedural
rule (an even less likely prospect), or if the judicial system is signifi-
cantly restructured (the least likely prospect). Instead of wringing our
hands over how bad nonprecedential opinions are, it is more construc-
tive to explore ways to minimize their negative effects. FRAP 32.1
was a good first step in that direction. But it was just a first step, and
progress should not stop here. The courts should use the momentum
FRAP 32.1 created to keep working to resolve the problems that non-
precedential opinions create and to institutionalize nonprecedential
opinions in a way that preserves the legitimacy of the judicial system.
provision is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that the time limit is so
short that it is unclear whether a district court realistically could make the requi-
site findings quickly enough to avoid the automatic stay. And historically, courts
have rejected time limits for decisionmaking because they interfere with the judi-
cial function. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. Although their results
seem anomalous, these modern separation of powers cases are the most likely
analogues for analyzing an amended version of FRAP 32.1, and the outcome
would turn on which analogy is more persuasive to the Court if it uses a func-
tional approach.
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:895
02
ZC a ro.
Cz
C
CCCC~
C)
~~CC) j~
a
Cz
z
952
CC C
. 4C HE
~~~~~~~ a)aCCC CC~ CC
Q a) ) mC -E;C :3- bz-,c d t
-ca
.-.- o m
~~c 2CLmC
2008] NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINIONS
bfl ~
.0 *~
0.zo
.s ~
.0 ~
zo
t 0
I ~
_ 000.
~-
z
"Ev -0 4 30
tow tw -
0 
0-r
-O.~ .O*
05 = a 0" ~
0. 00 :t m.' WA z . z z . .0O.
0~
07
Co) :3 0
r.0
C7 CL C2
A a- 0c 0 um
-0 r
Ir-
-~ -o
im 7a Q . OC
Po so ,- clD<
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:895
a,
CC
a,
a,
0
*0
a,
0
0z
C
0
} -,.= C
( ,
z,-aa
t a
E- I zU)C
C oo
>
WOO t~ a",Z ) 0
o o 0 .
C I 1: Cc 0) C C C0
U.a, a,
Ua,. ' -
r.
r 0 • "
CL4), Ei
o -0
CD - Ca, w
m ~CD t1Z 0C
a,
